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openIng remarks By 
shoBa sIVaprasad WadhIa1
proFessor, penn state LaW 
the 9/11 effect and its Legacy on U.s. Immigration Laws
penn state Law, september 16, 2011
good morning.  my name is shoba sivaprasad Wadhia and I will be your m.C. for today.  It is an honor to welcome
you to penn state’s Immigration symposium to mark the 10-year anniversary of 9/11.  today’s symposium is being
co-sponsored by penn state Law’s Center for Immigrants’ rights and school of International affairs. 
In the early months of 2001, immigration enjoyed appeal as both a political and policy matter.  Former president
george W. Bush and mexican president Vincente Fox had met several times to discuss the terms of U.s.-mexico re-
lations and immigration reform in particular.2 Bush and Fox were both former state governors who reached some
common ground on how Congress can comprehensively fix the immigration system or at the very least craft a le-
galization program for the then 3 million undocumented mexicans living in the U.s.      
the narrative on immigration changed dramatically following the tragic events of 9/11.   the majority of the 9/11
hijackers were able to obtain a visa from a U.s. consulate and enter through a point of inspection into the United
states without detection.  this fact alone revealed a vulnerability in the immigration system, and presented the
U.s. government with a challenging task of both addressing the failures of intelligence and gaps in domestic immi-
gration laws that may have contributed to 9/11, and also preserving american values of freedom, democracy, and
an open society.   
Following 9/11, the conflation of immigration and terrorism can be illustrated by the remarks of former attorney
general John ashcroft – he spoke at a conference to the U.s. mayors and in describing the zealousness with which
potential “terrorists” in the september 11, 2001 should be punished, remarked:
Let the terrorists among us be warned: If you overstay your visa— even by one day—we will arrest you. If you 
violate a local law, you will be put in jail and kept in custody as long as possible. We will use every available 
statute. We will seek every prosecutorial advantage. We will use all our weapons within the law and under the 
Constitution to protect life and enhance security for america.3
Congress made significant changes to immigration law and policy as a result of 9/11.  In 2002, Congress passed leg-
islation abolishing the Immigration and naturalization service (Ins) and creating a cabinet level department of
homeland security4 that among numerous functions houses immigration enforcement and services, a civil rights
office, and a policy directorate.  Leaving aside the coordination and leadership challenges of this new department,
moving the majority of immigration functions into a homeland security department sent a powerful message to
noncitizens and countries around the world. 
1shoba sivaprasad Wadhia, Clinical professor of Law and director, Center for Immigrants’ rights, penn state Law, opening remarks:  the 9/11 effect and its Legacy
on U.s. Immigration Laws (sept. 16, 2011), available at http://law.psu.edu/9_11_effect.
2eric schmitt, Getting to Know You: America Fills Fox’s Dance Card, n.y. tImes, apr. 8, 2001. 
3attorney general John ashcroft, speech to U.s. Conference of mayors (oct. 25, 2001).
4homeland security act of 2002, pub. L. no. 107-296, 116 stat. 2135 (2002).
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the executive branch also issued a number of regulatory and policy changes to immigration law and policy, many
of which targeted arab, muslim and south asian communities.  these policies (which will be discussed in more de-
tail by our speakers) included a new mechanism for tracking students and visitors entering and leaving the U.s.;
collecting information from males from specific countries; and enabling immigration officers to hold immigrants in
detention without charges for longer than 48 hours if an undefined exceptional circumstance was present. 
In the meantime, many of the same communities impacted by the changes made to immigration law and policy
after 9/11 forged alliances with political and civil rights organizations, built pro-democratic civil liberties institu-
tions of their own, and engaged in direct dialogue government agencies about the excesses of select post 9/11
laws. 
ten years later, several questions remain.  did the reorganization of immigration into the department of home-
land security and immigration policies crafted by the executive branch serve as effective national security tools?
Were these policies consistent with human rights instruments?  Were these policies racially motivated?  are the
communities impacted by 9/11 immigration policies still subject to heightened scrutiny?  If so, is the scrutiny legiti-
mate?  Where do we go from here?
today’s speakers will describe the lessons and impacts of post 9/11 immigration laws and policies against the nar-
ratives of human rights, national security, and race.  our speakers include the former head of Immigration Customs
enforcement, a community leader for the south asian community, a renowned writer and leader in migration pol-
icy, a lawyer who represented dozens of muslim men in new york after 9/11, a leading scholar in immigration and
race, a photography professor whose photos of U.s. immigration detention centers touched america, and a couple
subjected to unequal treatment after 9/11 allegedly based on religion. 
In the several months and years following 9/11, my work took me to small offices drafting and advancing legisla-
tion associated with the creation of the department of homeland security and basic protections for communities
impacted by overreaching policies; mosques and classrooms to engage community leaders and advocates across
america around policy change; a closed office door to write public comments to the latest proposed rule in the
Federal register; and security lines filled with anticipation for a productive dialogue with key members of agencies
responsible for administering immigration.  my experiences were life changing, and challenged me to place myself
in many different shoes, even if just temporarily.  these experiences also influenced my desire to bring together a
diverse composition of speakers for today’s event.  I believe an honest discussion about immigration issues ten
years later requires exposure to many different shoes – those worn by the scholar, community member, govern-
ment official, and lawyer and so on.  I hope that today’s speakers challenge your preconceptions and inspire dis-
cussion-- they have certainly been an inspiration to me. 
the 9/11 effect




the penn state school of International affairs (sIa) is honored to be a co-sponsor, with the Center for Immigrants’
rights, of the Symposium on The 9/11 Effect and its Legacy on U.S. Immigration Laws. For the sIa, this event is rele-
vant to its mission, namely to provide a unique environment for learning and professional development for penn
state graduate students and to prepare them for leadership positions in both national and international public serv-
ice in an increasingly interdependent world. the principal objective of our educational program is to increase the
students’ understanding of international affairs. the program is designed to meet the needs and interests of stu-
dents seeking to acquire substantive knowledge, practical skills and training necessary for them to become nation-
ally and internationally competitive in the host of international endeavors that increasingly intersect with
international affairs. more specifically, we aim to prepare students for the global work place of the 21st century by
combining multidisciplinary, policy-oriented studies with career development. 
one area that has become increasingly important for students and practitioners of international affairs to under-
stand more deeply is the subject of counter-terrorism and human rights. the subject has attracted considerable in-
terest since the shocking and tragic events of 9/11, as the U.s. and other nations around the world, as well as the
United nations and other regional organizations, have grappled with the challenges of formulating and implement-
ing policies and measures aimed at fighting international terrorism while ensuring compliance with their obliga-
tions under international law, in particular international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law. the tensions
between ensuring the public safety and security of nations while holding fast to long established traditions of re-
spect for human rights and civil liberties of citizens and non-citizens alike has been the focus of intense debates
among politicians and policymakers, and scholarly inquiry and discourses. While most of these debates have been
played out in the legal community—among legal academics and practitioners—students of international affairs
broadly speaking have also been significant participants in these conversations. among the issues that have been
the focus of these debates are the subjects chosen for the three panels in this symposium: immigration and human
rights, immigration and national security, and immigration and race.
the sIa is thus most pleased to welcome to the symposium the presenters and participants who have responded
positively to the invitation to pursue this conversation from the various perspectives today. the symposium is not
intended to be simply a forum for academic debates; rather we view it as an opportunity for participants to ex-
change views, debate ideas, interrogate current policies and offer practical suggestions and recommendations that
can contribute to a better understanding of the effect and legacy of 9/11 on the nation’s immigration laws and
more enlightened legislative policymaking by governments in future.
once again, on behalf of the penn state sIa community, I heartily welcome all the participants in this symposium
and thank them for their contributions. — tiyanjana maluwa 
openIng remarks By
tIyanJana maLUWa5
dIreCtor, penn state sChooL oF InternatIonaL aFFaIrs
the 9/11 effect and its Legacy on U.s. Immigration Laws
penn state Law, september 16, 2011
a Word of Welcome From the school of International affairs
5tiyanjana maluwa, associate dean for International affairs and h. Laddie montague Chair in Law; director of the penn state school of International affairs, penn
state University, opening remarks:  the 9/11 effect and its Legacy on U.s. Immigration Laws (sept. 16, 2011).
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The 9/11 effeCTand iTS legaCy on U.S. immigRaTion lawS • SepTembeR 16, 2011
pRogRam agenda
9:30 - 9:45 a.m. — welcome 
shoba sivaprasad Wadhia, penn state Law
9:45 - 11:15 a.m. — immigration and human Rights
tiyanjana maluwa, moderator, penn state school of International affairs 
Jumana musa, rights Working group
sarah paoletti, University of pennsylvania Law school
Wendy patten, open society Foundations
many of the 9/11 immigration policies have been analyzed under a human rights framework and in some cases
have been challenged as violating international treaties and conventions on human rights. to illustrate, the Justice
department’s own Inspector general found that many of the “special interest” detainees held in prisons as sus-
pected terrorists in the aftermath of 9/11 were physically and verbally abused, denied basic access to counsel or
family members, and ultimately charged with immigration violations.
11:30 a.m. - 1:00 p.m. — immigration and national Security
margaret stock, moderator, Lane powell pC and University of alaska
donald kerwin Jr., Center for migration studies 
kareem shora, department of homeland security
Julie myers Wood, ICs Consulting, LLC and Immigration and Customs solutions, LLC 
Immediately following 9/11, the United states made many changes to immigration laws and policies, with “national
security” needs given as a justification for many of those changes. some of these changes were prudent responses
and improved the general effectiveness of U.s. law enforcement by more fully integrating immigration violations
into other significant law enforcement investigations, and more directly addressing the potential vulnerabilities in
our immigration system. the efficacy of other changes, however, has been questioned. In some cases, the changes
were not particularly intelligence-based and were not even found to “catch terrorists” or improve security in a
meaningful way. In other cases, the agencies and actors responsible for changing some policies were not ques-
tioned or held accountable on their efficacy.   
1:00 - 2:00 p.m. — lunch and plenary
erich scherfen and rubina tareen
steven rubin — photographs featuring U.S. prisons holding immigration detainees
2:00 - 3:30 p.m. — immigration and Race
Victor romero, moderator, penn state Law
susan m. akram, Boston University school of Law
sin yen Ling, asian Law Caucus
priya murthy, south asian americans Leading together
the impact of 9/11 immigration policies on communities of color and in particular arabs and south asians from
muslim-majority countries is striking. the most controversial domestic program was a “special registration” rule
that enlisted tens of thousands of young males from 24 muslim countries (plus north korea) and resulted in the
prosecution of thousands of individuals with minor visa violations. ten years later, many people impacted by pro-
grams like the special registration program continue to fight their immigration cases.    
3:30 - 3:45 p.m. — Conclusion
shoba sivaprasad Wadhia, penn state Law
3:45 - 5:15 p.m. — Reception
human Rights implications of post-9/11 immigration policies:  a look back Ten years later
In the weeks and months following the terrorist attacks of september 11, 2001, several high-profile counter-terror-
ism measures were put in place, such as the enactment of the Usa patrIot act, the issuance of an executive order
authorizing military commission trials, and the opening of the detention center at guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  another
very significant shift played out less publicly in the department of Justice’s reworking of U.s. immigration laws.  In
the wake of 9/11, the Bush administration moved swiftly to implement new policies that vastly expanded its au-
thority to detain and investigate non-citizens, using its considerable discretion in implementing immigration laws in
ways that undermined the basic rights of non-citizens.  Whether they were held as so-called special interest de-
tainees, or subjected to special entry-exit registration requirements, or removed to countries where they faced a
risk of torture, non-citizens encountered immigration policies that were profoundly altered in the aftermath of
9/11.      
While some of these measures are not currently in use and some, in particular the special interest detentions, have
not been used for years, many of these authorities remain on the books and could be used in the future.  It is criti-
cally important to understand and assess these measures and ensure that misguided policies that violate basic
rights are not reinstituted in a future time of crisis.        
Special interest detentions
In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, supporters of anti-immigrant measures found common cause with the Bush ad-
ministration in justifying expansive new immigration authorities in the name of national security.  the department
of Justice (doJ) began focusing on immigrants almost immediately.  In the weeks following the attacks, doJ imple-
mented a new set of policies for a growing category of non-citizens who became known as special interest de-
tainees.  In total, more than 760 predominantly muslim men were held as special interest detainees.  many of the
detainees were held for weeks, even months, without being charged.  Ultimately, none was charged with a crime
related to the attacks of 9/11; many were deported for visa violations.  
the special interest detentions raised numerous human rights concerns ranging from prolonged arbitrary detention
to interference with the right to counsel to unduly harsh conditions of confinement.  the special policies put in
place for these immigrant detainees in the aftermath of 9/11 are described below.  an overarching problem was
the haphazard way in which individuals were placed in the special immigrant category, which then resulted in their
being subjected to this special set of policies that violated basic rights.  
“Hold Until Cleared” 
In the days after 9/11, doJ implemented a policy that required immigration officials to hold all special interest de-
tainees until the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had cleared them of any terrorist connections.  this policy re-
sulted in persons being held far longer than normally would have been the case.  Furthermore, in some cases,
special interest detainees remained in custody well after their immigration cases had concluded with an order that
Wendy patten
senIor poLICy anaLyst, open soCIety poLICy Center
and
eBony Wade
stUdent, amerICan UnIVersIty WashIngton CoLLege oF LaW
the 9/11 effect and its Legacy on U.s. Immigration Laws





































they be removed from the United states.  rather than effectuating the removal orders, the Immigration and natu-
ralization service (Ins) kept them in custody while the FBI continued to investigate them.  
Critical to understanding the “hold until cleared” policy was the process by which non-citizens were placed in the
special interest category in the first place, a process which doJ’s own Inspector general criticized as haphazard and
indiscriminate.6 the criteria for determining whether a non-citizen was of interest to the 9/11 investigation were
never made clear.  For example, non-citizens who were encountered randomly by law enforcement officials in the
course of their investigation of the attacks were often placed in special interest detention, even if they had no con-
nection to terrorism.  What is clear is that special interest detentions focused on arab and muslim men.  the vast
majority of non-citizens placed on the special interest list were of middle eastern, arab, or south asian origin.  Just
under half of the detainees were from egypt and pakistan. 
most of the special interest detainees were arrested for routine immigration violations, such as overstaying their
visas, which would not have warranted lengthy detention prior to 9/11.  however, doJ kept these individuals de-
tained on immigration grounds while it investigated them for ties to terrorist activity, despite legal prohibitions
against criminal detention in the absence of probable cause that the person had committed a crime.
Prolonged Arbitrary Detention
on september 20, 2001, the Ins increased the length of time that immigration authorities could detain a non-citi-
zen without charging him with an immigration violation.  previously, the rule was 24 hours with no exception for
emergency situations; this regulation was quietly changed to 48 hours with “an additional reasonable period of
time” in cases of emergency or other extraordinary circumstance.7 What constituted an emergency or extraordi-
nary circumstance was left undefined and the new rule set no limit on the time period for which a person could be
held in such situations.  thus, immigration detainees could be held indefinitely without charge and denied the due
process rights typically afforded to criminal suspects, even if they were being held in connection with a criminal in-
vestigation (i.e., in connection with the 9/11 attacks).  the impact of this rule change was felt immediately.  human
rights Watch documented many instances of prolonged detention without charge, including some cases of up to
four months.8 this practice of arbitrary detention contravenes both international and U.s. constitutional law.
Overriding Judicial Orders to Release Individuals on Bond
In an immigration bond hearing, a judge determines whether a non-citizen arrested on immigration charges is a
danger to the community or a flight risk and thus should remain in detention pending immigration proceedings.
prior to 9/11, aliens without criminal records who had committed minor visa violations were typically released with
either a low bond or no bond at all.  however, after 9/11, doJ instituted a “no-bond” policy for all special interest
detainees and set extremely high bonds for others.  In october 2001, the Ins issued an “automatic stay” rule that
allowed doJ to override judicial decisions to release non-citizens on bond in cases in which the government had re-
quested either no bond or a bond over $10,000.9 after a bond hearing in an individual case, doJ could simply in-
voke the new regulation to stay the judge’s decision automatically and keep the person detained, notwithstanding
a judicial ruling that the person should be released.  
Interference with the Right to Counsel
Both domestic and international human rights laws protect an individual’s right to be represented by legal counsel
when detained for criminal or immigration violations.  having a lawyer present is a particularly important safe-
guard for immigrant detainees who are often unfamiliar with the U.s. legal system and unaware of their rights.
Under U.s. constitutional law, anyone in custodial interrogation for criminal matters has the right to have an attor-
ney present, including free representation if needed.  those detained for immigration proceedings do not auto-
matically have such a right but must be permitted to secure representation on their own. 
special interest detainees encountered challenges in accessing representation in their immigration cases, in partic-
ular due to a communications blackout at the principal detention center where detainees were held in the first few
6U.s. dep’t oF JUstICe, oFFICe oF the InspeCtor generaL, the septemBer 11 detaInees: a reVIeW oF the treatment oF aLIens heLd on ImmIgratIon
Charges In ConneCtIon WIth the InVestIgatIon oF the septemBer 11 attaCks (June 2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/0306/full.pdf.
78 C.F.r. § 287, Ins no. 2171-01.
8hUman rIghts WatCh, presUmptIon oF gUILt:  hUman rIghts aBUses oF post-septemBer 11 detaInees 50 (2002), available at http://www.hrw.org/
reports/2002/us911/.
98 C.F.r. part 3, Ins no. 2172-01; ag order no. 2528-2001.  
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weeks after 9/11.  equally troubling was the way the FBI circumvented the right to counsel by interrogating de-
tainees being held on immigration charges about criminal matters without affording them their miranda rights, as
is required in custodial interrogation of criminal suspects.  In some cases, the detainees were not told they had a
right to counsel until after being questioned by the FBI; others simply had their requests for counsel ignored.  By
unlawfully engaging in criminal questioning of detainees in immigration custody, doJ misused the immigration laws
in order to circumvent fundamental human rights and constitutional protections for criminal suspects.
Unduly Harsh Detention Conditions
In 2003, the doJ’s office of Inspector general issued a report detailing the abusive conditions to which some sep-
tember 11 detainees were subjected, notably those held at new york’s metropolitan detention Center.  the Inspec-
tor general found evidence of a pattern of physical and verbal abuse.  the physical abuse included slamming
detainees into walls, twisting their arms and hands, and stepping on the chains of their leg restraints.10 many de-
tainees were held on 23-hour per day lockdown and in cells that were illuminated 24 hours per day for months, in-
terfering with their ability to sleep.  many were prevented from communicating with their families and even with
attorneys, and later had only very limited telephone access that made family and counsel contacts difficult.  such
treatment and detention conditions are inconsistent with human rights standards.11
nSeeRS (Special Registration)
In mid-2002, the government announced a new program called the national security entry-exit registration system
(nseers), which required visitors from designated countries, as well as individuals meeting undisclosed criteria, to
be registered, fingerprinted, and photographed upon entering the United states.  they subsequently had to report
for follow-up interviews after 30 days and then again after one year, as well as register their departure.  In the call-
in registration program, nationals of 24 muslim-majority countries and north korea who were already in the United
states were required to report to immigration authorities to be similarly documented and interviewed.  Call-in reg-
istration applied to men and boys over age 16 who had entered the United states before september 2002.
the nseers rules and deadlines were “complex, confusing, poorly publicized, and rolled out piecemeal.”12 even
seasoned immigration attorneys were unsure as to who was required to register.  a Canadian citizen living in the
United states could be considered an Iraqi national if he had been born in Iraq even if he had lived in Canada his
entire life. the inconsistent application of the program and its unclear rules led to many individuals being put into
removal proceedings after making innocent mistakes in their attempts to comply.
While the Bush administration made some limited adjustments to the nseers program, its core elements re-
mained in effect despite serious concerns about both its ineffectiveness and its discriminatory nature.  nseers re-
flects a tendency toward programs that sweep too broadly, often using national origin as a basis for enforcement
rather than individualized behavior.  such blunt instruments for countering terrorism are far less likely to be suc-
cessful than policies that are appropriately targeted to detecting actual threats.  such programs are not only inef-
fective but also counterproductive, giving rise to charges of profiling and discrimination based on national origin or
religion.  nseers targeted entire communities, making them feel suspect and unfairly subjected to special scrutiny
based solely on their religion, ethnicity, or country of origin.
In april 2011, after years of criticism of nseers and calls for its termination, the department of homeland security
(dhs) ended the nseers program.  Instead of rescinding the regulation, however, dhs “de-listed” all of the coun-
tries whose nationals were subject to the nseers registration requirements.13 While advocates welcomed the ter-
mination of the program, they voiced concern that the regulation had not been rescinded and that a list of
countries could be easily reinstated should dhs choose to do so.  advocates for affected communities continue to
urge dhs to deal appropriately and humanely with those who have suffered negative consequences due to this
confusing and discriminatory policy. 
10U.s. dep’t oF JUstICe, supra note 6.
11For more on the special interest detentions and efforts to challenge them, see Wendy patten, The Impact of September 11 and the Struggle against Terrorism on
the U.S. Domestic Human Rights Movement, in BrIngIng hUman rIghts home: a hIstory oF hUman rIghts In the UnIted states (Cynthia soohoo et al.,
praeger publishers, 2008).  
12ImmIgratIon poLICy Center, targets oF sUspICIon: the ImpaCt oF post 9/11 poLICIes on mUsLIms, araBs and soUth asIans In the UnIted states 4
(2004), available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/targets%20of%20suspicion.pdf.
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extraordinary Rendition: Transfer to Risk of Torture 
extraordinary rendition involves the transfer, most often outside of legal procedures, of a person to another coun-
try where he or she may be at risk of torture.  such transfers are prohibited by the Un Convention against torture
and the International Covenant on Civil and political rights, both of which were ratified by the United states in the
early 1990s.  after the 9/11 attacks, however, individuals suspected of terrorism were secretly and unlawfully
transferred to other countries for detention and interrogation despite the risk that they would be tortured. 
In what has become one of the most well-known rendition cases, maher arar, a syrian-born Canadian citizen, was
detained at new york’s kennedy airport while en route to his home in Canada on september 26, 2002.14 after
eight hours of interrogation by the FBI, the Ins, and the new york police department, arar was transferred to a
nearby detention center and held for nearly two weeks.  during his detention, he was held in solitary confinement
and subjected to prolonged interrogation without his lawyer present.  When asked to return voluntarily to syria,
arar refused, fearing that he would be tortured.  he stated that he wanted to return to his home in Canada.  on
october 9, he was flown to Jordan and then transferred to a prison in syria.  he spent nearly a year in a tiny cell in
a syrian jail where he was beaten and brutally interrogated by syrian intelligence agents.  Finally, in october 2003,
arar was released and sent home.  
the Bush administration failed to adequately explain why it sent maher arar to syria and not to Canada.  In the
face of concerns about torture in syria, the U.s. government sought “diplomatic assurances” from the syrian gov-
ernment, despite the fact that it was widely known to use torture in interrogating prisoners.  the Bush administra-
tion never justified how the transfer could have been deemed lawful given the absolute prohibition on transfers to
risk of torture under U.s. and international law.  arar’s lawsuit against U.s. officials responsible for his rendition to
syria was dismissed by U.s. courts on national security and foreign policy grounds.  While the Canadian govern-
ment formally apologized to arar and paid him substantial compensation, the United states has neither apologized
nor accepted responsibility for its handling of his rendition to syria through an immigration removal case. 
Citizens and non-Citizens: a hierarchy of Rights 
the immigration policies put in place as counter-terrorism measures after 9/11 tended to expand and reinforce a
perception of a hierarchy of rights between citizens and non-citizens.  many justified these and other new counter-
terrorism policies by arguing that non-citizens were not entitled to the same rights as citizens.  human rights advo-
cates, however, pointed to international human rights standards to underscore that human rights are rooted in the
inherent dignity of all human beings, regardless of citizenship status.  they also pointed out that the U.s. Constitu-
tion distinguishes between citizens and non-citizens only with regard to voting and holding federal elective office.
otherwise, the Constitution refers to persons, not citizens.  as a constitutional matter, the assertion that immi-
grants are not entitled to, for example, the same right to a fair trial as citizens is clearly incorrect.
still, this erroneous idea has continued to influence policy debates about counter-terrorism, reaching beyond im-
migration enforcement to other measures that apply only to non-citizens.  numerous counter-terrorism policies,
such as military commissions, have drawn distinctions between citizens and non-citizens in ways that are inconsis-
tent with both human rights standards and U.s. constitutional principles.  In many ways, this hierarchy of rights
may be the most problematic and enduring impact of these policies in human rights terms.  
today, 10 years after the 9/11 attacks, our national conversation about immigration policy is a different one – one
that is largely framed by national security concerns.  the three policies discussed in this paper – special interest de-
tentions, nseers, and rendition in the form of removal of immigrants to risk of torture – were implemented in the
aftermath of the attacks.  While some of these new immigration policies have since been abandoned, their effects
remain.  It is important to reflect on these policies, learn from the mistakes that were made, and ensure that they
are not repeated in the future. 
13U.s. Customs & Border patrol, Important nseers Information (may 20, 2011), http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/travel/id_visa/nseers/imp_nseers_info.xml (may 20,
2011).
14Center For ConstItUtIonaL rIghts, eXtraordInary rendItIon: the story oF maher arar (2010), available at
http://ccrjustice.org/files/new%20arar%20Factsheet%2011.2010.pdf.
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The lessons of 9/11 and immigration: Some progress, many missed opportunities, and a long way to go
shortly after 9/11, Benjamin Johnson and I argued in a paper on immigration and national security15 that to pre-
vent future terrorist attacks, the United states must focus its attention and resources on the gaps in intelligence
gathering and information sharing that allowed nineteen terrorists to enter and attack the United states. We ar-
gued that national security is most effectively enhanced by improving the mechanisms for identifying actual terror-
ists, not by implementing harsher immigration laws or blindly treating all foreigners as potential terrorists. We
pointed out that policies and practices that fail to properly distinguish between terrorists and legitimate foreign
travelers are ineffective security tools that waste limited resources, damage the U.s. economy, alienate those
groups whose cooperation the U.s. government needs to prevent terrorism, and foster a false sense of security.  
We offered ten immigration policy prescriptions that would improve Us national security and yet not jeopardize the
immigration system’s ability to be an effective tool in the fight against terrorism.  ten years after 9/11, how is the
United states doing on each of these recommendations?
1. We recommended that the United states adequately fund the development of new technology that uses
biometric data to identify and track individuals who travel to and from the United states.  today, that goal has 
mostly been achieved on the front end, as the United states today has an entry system that uses biometric data
(fingerprints and photographs) to identify persons entering the United states.  a full exit system remains an un-
achieved and extraordinarily expensive goal, although a partial exit tracking system exists.16
2. We recommended the integration of information sharing among federal agencies, and that goal has also
largely been met. But work remains to be done on related issues that we identified: security databases do not in-
clude full safe guards against potential abuse of data, do not ensure the security and confidentiality of information,
and do not fully protect the privacy rights of individuals about whom information is collected. some progress has
been made on procedures to determine how information is entered into and removed from the databases, but er-
roneous data is still a significant issue.  privacy protections and information accuracy can enhance security and
should be given the same level of attention that is given to the collection of data.
3. We recommended implementing a comprehensive, adequately funded, and workable entry-exit system
that allows for evaluation of threats on a case-by-case basis, rather than profiling entire groups.  We also empha-
sized that legitimate travelers should be allowed to get through immigration checkpoints quickly.  the United states
has made substantial progress in this area, although much work remains to be done.  Legitimate travelers still re-
margaret stoCk
Lt. CoL. (ret.)
CoUnseL to the FIrm at Lane poWeLL pC
adJUnCt proFessor, UnIVersIty oF aLaska, anChorage
the 9/11 effect and its Legacy on U.s. Immigration Laws
penn state Law, september 16, 2011
15BenJamIn Johnson & margaret d. stoCk, ImmIgratIon poLICy Center, the Lessons oF 9/11: a FaILUre oF InteLLIgenCe, not ImmIgratIon LaW
(2003), available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/pF%20911%20final.pdf.
16Julia preston, U.S. Inquiry Traces Foreigners With Visas, n.y. tImes, sept. 13, 2011, at a19.
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port problems with “security” rules being blindly applied to exclude persons who pose no real threat to the United
states.
4. We recommended making the U.s. border the last line of defense against terrorism, not the first, by pursu-
ing multilateral strategies with Canada and mexico to create a north american perimeter safety Zone; requiring all
airlines flying to the United states, including foreign airlines, to transmit passengers' names at take-off to the desti-
nation airport so that they can be checked against the look-out list; and increasing the use of pre-clearance 
and pre-inspection programs that provide U.s. officials the opportunity to check passengers for admission prior to
their boarding a flight to the United states (while including safeguards to allow asylum protection for those who
truly deserve it).  the United states has made substantial progress in achieving these goals.  travelers from many
countries can now log onto the esta system and find out in advance of boarding a flight whether they are likely to
be denied admission to the United states.  Incidents like the infamous Cat stevens scenario—where the British
rock star’s Us-bound plane was diverted and the rock star expeditiously removed from the Us because of a past
contribution to a muslim charitable organization—have been reduced.  the United states and Canada have formal-
ized much border cooperation and information-sharing through bilateral agreements and cooperative arrangements
such as Integrated Border enforcement teams (IBets).  mexico and the U.s. are also attempting to cooperate on
many border security issues.
5. We recommended creating an office within the department of homeland security whose mission would be
to gain the cooperation of immigrants in the war on terrorism through policies that have an intelligence, rather than
an enforcement, perspective.  this goal has not been achieved.  Within dhs, agencies continue to follow the old
path of gaining the cooperation of immigrants only on an ad hoc basis as enforcement officers encounter them in
the course of traditional investigative work.  the FBI has a more formal program to gain the cooperation of immi-
grants, but it has been heavily criticized as being ineffective and misdirected.17
6. We recommended training immigration officials to understand the tactics, techniques, and procedures
used by terrorists, as well as in ways to obtain community cooperation in uncovering threats.  dhs has made improve-
ments in this regard, although much work remains to be done in obtaining community cooperation in uncovering
threats.  the agency still relies too much on blind application of rules without individualized evaluation of the
threat that a particular person might pose.
7. We recommended simplifying immigration laws in order to address security threats, while eliminating ex-
traneous or provisions and repealing provisions that tie up resources and add to the complexity and confusion of
our immigration system without measurably enhancing our security (i.e., Ina §212(a)(9)(B)).  Little or no progress
has been made on this front, although some relatively minor improvements have been made to the “material sup-
port to terrorism” provisions of the laws, which previously resulted in anomalous situations where Us allies were
barred from the United states for having helped to overthrow saddam hussein, to give just one example.18
8. We recommended expanding the grounds of eligibility and the number of visas available to persons who
provide valuable information on terrorist threats.  some progress has been made with regard to the issuance of s.
t. and U visas, but work on this issue continues to be necessary.  after 9/11, Congress did enact legislation to pro-
vide visas to certain persons who worked with the United states in Iraq and afghanistan, but problems with 
processing those visas still persist.
9. We recommended developing a comprehensive legalization program to allow unauthorized immigrants in
the United states to obtain legal status, along with a guest-worker program to provide a legal and orderly flow of
immigrants to fill legitimate labor market needs, in order to allow enforcement efforts to focus on terrorists.  no
progress has been made on this objective, although recently the obama administration announced that it would
use “prosecutorial discretion” to try to prioritize its enforcement efforts.  Unfortunately, a program allowing for
17petra Bartosiewicz, To Catch A Terrorist: The FBI Hunts for the Enemy Within, harper’s magaZIne, aug. 2011.
18karen deyoung, Stalwart Service for U.S. in Iraq Is Not Enough to Gain Green Card, Wash. post, mar. 23, 2008, at a01.
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the limited use of prosecutorial discretion in some cases does not allow most immigrants to come out of the shad-
ows, become documented, pay penalties, pay taxes, or buy health insurance. the more formal use of prosecutorial
discretion is a small step forward in the appropriate use of enforcement resources, but does little to address the
underlying problem.
10.We recommended restoring integrity to the system by creating a judicial review process for overseas visa de-
nials, to ensure that consular officers are applying consistent policies, and restoring discretion to immigration
judges and officials so they can allow aliens who are not security threats to stay in the United states, rather than
wasting resources on deporting deserving individuals with ties to our country (i.e., restoration of the old "suspen-
sion of deportation" provisions).  Little to no progress has been made in this area; clients continue to report that
consular officers make arbitrary decisions that are not supported by law, and agency resources continue to focus on
non-citizens who are no threat to the United states, and who could make valuable contributions to the U.s. if they
were permitted to reside here legally.  For example, the department of state recently denied an immigrant visa to
the spouse of a Us soldier because the spouse had worked unlawfully in the United states; a consular officer deter-
mined that she was permanently barred from the United states because of the unlawful employment on “false
claim to Us citizen” grounds.  Because his wife was permanently barred from living in the Us and was unable to ob-
tain parole from UsCIs, the soldier was forced to leave the Us army so that he could live—outside the United
states—with his wife and children.  the United states is not better protected when consular officers make such de-
cisions and immigrants have no recourse to review them.
there have been many negative developments in the immigration policy arena since 9/11, and it is now generally
conceded that the government overreacted in some areas.  yet even after government officials have admitted to an
overreaction and rescind faulty policies, the after effects of failed policies linger on.19 other problems have re-
sulted from the federal government’s failure to exercise leadership in resolving problems; emotion and fear have
overcome reasoned cost-benefit analysis in many areas.  the federal government’s inability to convince state and
local governments that it is adequately addressing immigration issues has led some of those governments to try to
take matters into their own hands, creating costly problems for the federal government and leading to an overload
of immigration cases in the court system. the explosive growth in the immigration detention system has not meas-
urably added to american security, but has cost the Us taxpayer billions and created a new prison-industrial com-
plex.  the climate of fear of immigrants has not abated since 9/11, and many seem to be profiting from it. agencies
continue to report difficulty in integrating intelligence analysis into law enforcement operations.20 In the words of
stephen Flynn, “stepped-up enforcement along the mexican border suggests that U.s. efforts aimed at hardening
its borders can have the unintended consequences of creating the kind of environment that is conducive to terror-
ists and criminals,” a phenomenon Flynn calls the “hardened border paradox.”21 Finally, dhs has “failed to develop
a border security strategy that complements Us domestic and national security objectives.”22
nor has the poor health of the economy caused policymakers to re-think immigration rules in a way that enhances
our economic security.  Foreigners with legitimate business in the United states or who seek to invest here con-
tinue to report arbitrary behavior by government agencies. Within the Us, United states Citizenship & Immigration
services has become legendary for its oppressive “requests for evidence” and denials of legitimate petitions for
employment-related visas.  american employers find that it is often easier to outsource jobs than to comply with
legal immigration procedures.  Immigration policies are not supporting america’s need for economic security.
19For example, the department of homeland security has admitted that the costly national security entry exit registration system (nseers) was a failure, and has
removed countries from the nseers list, but has failed to rescind nseers regulations or address the impact on persons wrongly targeted by nseers.
20LoIs m. daVIs et aL., Long term eFFeCts oF LaW enForCement’s post-9/11 FoCUs on CoUnterterrorIsm and homeLand seCUrIty (2010) (“Leas are
finding it harder and harder to make the case for investigating in [counterterrorism] and [homeland security] and the long-term benefits of such investments”).
21stephen FLynn, amerICa the VULneraBLe: hoW oUr goVernment Is FaILIng to proteCt Us From terrorIsm (2004).




there have been a few bright spots on the immigration and security front: the department of defense and the de-
partment of homeland security have cooperated on new initiatives to benefit the Us military, and those initiatives
have helped military members and their families in ways that directly benefit Us national security.  Immigrants
who enlist in the army and navy now can usually obtain expedited citizenship at basic training.23 military mem-
bers and their families have benefitted from the use of prosecutorial discretion in appropriate cases.24 the maVnI
(military accessions Vital to the national Interest) pilot program, started under the Bush administration but run as
a pilot program in 2009, brought a thousand legal non-citizens into the Us military to fill vital language and health
care jobs, saving the U.s. government hundreds of thousands of dollars in the process.  Unfortunately, the obama
administration has to date—through bureaucratic inefficiency—failed to extend the program, despite maVnI’s
demonstrated value to the war on terrorism.25 nor has the administration made it a high priority to ease the visa
process for those Iraqis and afghans who have helped the Us in overseas conflicts, although new visa categories
were created for such persons under the Bush administration.
overall, the Us has made some progress in addressing immigration and security issues in the decade since 9/11—
but much time and many resources have also been squandered on missteps, and much remains to be done.  the
United states still lacks an overall immigration-and-national security strategy.  and most of the criticisms that Ben-
jamin Johnson and I made in our paper remain true today:  harsher immigration laws may give americans the im-
pression that security has been enhanced, but in reality, they serve mainly to deflect attention and resources away
from the key goal of improving intelligence gathering and information sharing.  ten years later, we still have a long
way to go. 
23Inexplicably, the air Force and marine Corps do not participate in this program, although its benefits to the military are tangible and substantial.
24Jason Buch, Immigration provision Can Benefit military spouses, san antonIo neWs-eXpress (June 30, 2011), available at
http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/article/Immigration-provision-can-benefit-military-spouses-1446014.php.
25Julia preston, Thriving Military Recruitment Program Blocked, n.y. tImes, Jan. 21, 2010 (“recruiting officials said they were waiting for senior readiness officials in
the office of defense secretary robert m. gates to approve an extension of the program.”).
 
 the 9/11 effect
- 15 -
US Refugee protection policy Ten years after 9/11
the george W. Bush administration responded to the 9/11 terrorist attacks with a succession of immigration-re-
lated security measures. It also invoked national security to justify longstanding immigration control policies and
practices.  over the last decade, significant progress has been made in reducing the immigration-related vulnerabil-
ities exposed by the attacks, particularly in the areas of information sharing and screening.  however, national secu-
rity proved a poor rubric for many immigration control measures,  and some post-9/11 strategies – like the call-in
registration program for men from select middle-eastern and south asian nations – failed to increase security and
raised civil rights concerns.27 In addition, anti-terror measures have perversely resulted in reduced protections to
the victims of terrorism and persecution.28 this short paper will review the Us refugee protection system ten years
after the 9/11 attacks.
pre-9/11 Restrictions
the refugee act of 1980 represented a high water mark in the establishment of the Us refugee protection system,
creating the formal Us refugee resettlement program and bringing domestic law into conformity with international
refugee law.29
Between 1980 and the 9/11 attacks, several developments eroded the Us refugee protection edifice. In 1993, for
example, the Us supreme Court held that the legal prohibition on return of persons to countries where their lives
or freedom would be threatened – contained in article 33 of the Un Convention relating to the status of refugees
and the Immigration and nationality act (Ina) -- did not apply to foreign nationals interdicted on the high seas.30
UnhCr’s executive Committee (eXCom), as well as numerous commentators, vehemently disagreed with this deci-
sion, arguing that it eviscerated the principle of non-refoulement.31
the Illegal Immigration reform and Immigrant responsibility act of 1996 (IIrIra) created the “expedited removal”
process, which summarily turns away migrants caught near land and sea borders or stopped at ports of entry, who
lack proper documents and who do not request asylum or express a fear of persecution.32 the number of expe-
dited removals has ranged between 106,025 and 112,716 in each of the last five years.33 the Us Commission on
donaLd kerWIn
eXeCUtIVe dIreCtor, Center For mIgratIon stUdIes
the 9/11 effect and its Legacy on U.s. Immigration Laws
penn state Law, september 16, 2011
26different arms of the federal government, for example, cited national security concerns to support the interdiction, repatriation and detention of haitian boat peo-
ple, the safe third country asylum agreement with Canada, and the indefinite detention of persons who could not be removed.
27donald kerwin, The Use and Misuse of ‘National Security’ Rationale in Crafting US Refugee and Immigration Policies, 17 Int’l J. refugee L. 749 (2005). 
28donaLd kerWIn, mIgratIon poLICy Center, the FaLterIng Us reFUgee proteCtIon program: LegaL and poLICy responses to reFUgees, asyLUm
seekers, and others In need oF proteCtIon (2011), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/refugeeprotection-2011.pdf.
29the refugee act of 1980, pub. L. no. 96-212, 94 stat. 102 (march 17, 1980), Us statutes at Large 94 (1980): 103.
30Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.s. 155 (1993).
31UnhCr, executive Committee, Interception of asylum-seekers and refugees: the International Framework and recommendations for a Comprehensive approach,
¶ 23, Un doc. eC/50/sC/Crp.17, (June 9, 2000), available at www.unhcr.org/4963237411.html.
32the Illegal Immigrant reform and Immigrant responsibility act (IIrIra) of 1996, pub. L. no. 104-208, 110 stat. 3009-546 (sept. 30, 1996). Us statutes at Large 110
(1996): 3009.




34Us CommIssIon on InternatIonaL reLIgIoUs Freedom (UsCIrF), report on asyLUm seekers In eXpedIted remoVaL, VoLUme II 20-23 (2005), available at
www.uscirf.gov/images/stories/pdf/asylum_seekers/evalCredibleFear.pdf.
35J. dombach, J. ramji-nogales, p. schrag & a. schoenholtz, Rejecting Refugees: Homeland Security’s Administration of the One-Year Bar to Asylum,  52 Wm. & mary
L. reV. 651, 688 (2010).
36natIonaL ImmIgrant JUstICe Center, hUman rIghts FIrst (hrF), penn state LaW’s Center For ImmIgrant rIghts, the one-year asyLUm deadLIne
and the BIa: an anaLysIs oF Board oF ImmIgratIon appeaLs deCIsIon 2005-2008, 6-7 (2010), available at www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-
content/uploads/pdf/1yd-report-FULL.pdf.   
37dombach, supra note 35, at 717-718.
38Between Fy 2006 and Fy 2010, the rates of legal representation in removal proceedings ranged from 35 to 43 percent.
39Juan osuna, acting director, executive office for Immigration review (eoIr), presentation at migration policy Institute (mpI), mar. 14, 2011, available at
http://events.powerstream.net/002/00592/20110314mpI/#powershow. 
40UsCIrF, supra note 34, at 197-198, 412-413. 
41J. ramji-nogales, a. schoenholtz, & p. schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 stan. L. rev. 295 (2007).
42U.s. dep’t of homeland security (dhs), Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2010, Table 13 (2011), http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/publications/Lpr10.shtm.   
43U.s. dep’t oF state (dos), BUreaU oF popULatIon, reFUgees and mIgratIon (prm), sUmmary oF reFUgee admIssIons as oF 31-JULy-2011 (2011), avail-
able at http://www.wrapsnet.org/Wraps/reports/admissionsarrivals/tabid/211/default.aspx. 
International religious Freedom found that one of every six migrants subject to this process who expressed a fear
of return was summarily removed in contravention of the law.34
IIrIra also added the requirement that asylum-seekers file their claims within one year of entry. a recent study on
the impact of this requirement in affirmative asylum cases found that over an 11-year period, 31 percent failed to
meet the filing deadline.35 according to the Us department of homeland security (dhs), Us Citizenship and Immi-
gration services (UsCIs), 71 percent of affirmative mexican asylum applicants between Fy 1998 and Fy 2010 did
not file for asylum within one year. another important study found that in one in five administratively appealed
cases the appellant missed the filing deadline.36 security concerns have also affected the interpretation of refugee
protection laws and policies.  the affirmative asylum study, for example, found that asylum officers had been ad-
vised to interpret the one-year deadline more stringently following 9/11.37
Lack of legal counsel has undermined the integrity of the removal adjudication system since long before 9/11 or
even the refugee act of 1980. Immigrants cannot effectively represent themselves in removal proceedings, but
most are not able to afford legal counsel.38 In recent years, only 15 percent of detained immigrants have been able
to secure legal representation.39 detained asylum-seekers also abandon their claims at higher rates than do non-
detained immigrants.40 represented asylum-seekers have repeatedly been found to prevail in their cases at far
higher rates than those without representation.  Legal representation has been identified as “the single most im-
portant factor affecting the outcome” of an asylum case.41
as these examples illustrate, Us refugee protections had weakened even prior to 9/11.  the 9/11 attacks led to fur-
ther restrictions and made national security the dominant immigration paradigm, as evidenced by the creation of
the dhs in 2003.
The US Refugee Resettlement program
the United states has admitted roughly 3 million refugees since 1975, with record high admission levels of 207,116
in 1980 and 159,252 in 1981.42 Following 9/11, admissions fell sharply – to 26,785 in 2001 and 28,286 in 2002 –
while dhs initiated a necessary review of the program’s security vulnerabilities. By Fy 2009, admissions had re-
bounded to nearly 75,000.  however, they will likely fall below this figure in Fy 2011 due to overlapping security
clearance processes. With two months remaining in Fy 2011, only 43,687 refugees had been admitted, despite an
admissions ceiling of 80,000.43
Beyond the normal clearance process, select refugees must undergo security advisory opinion reviews (saos).
the classified criteria that determines who receives saos has reportedly not changed since shortly after 9/11, bely-
ing the post-9/11 consensus that improved intelligence would lead to evolving and more targeted screening deci-
sions.  
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44hUman rIghts FIrst, LIVIng In LImBo: IraQI reFUgees and Us resettLement 21-26 (2010), available at www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/Liv-
ing-in-Limbo-final.pdf.  See also U.s. gov’t accountability office (gao), gao-09-120, IraQI reFUgee assIstanCe: ImproVements needed In measUrIng
progress, assessIng needs, traCkIng FUnds, and deVeLopIng an InternatIonaL strategIC pLan 33 (2009), available at
www.gao.gov/new.items/d09120.pdf.
45The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, public Law 107-56, Us statutes at
Large 115 (2001): 272; The REAL ID Act of 2005, public Law 109-13, Us statutes at Large 119 (2005): 231.
46Ina § 212(a)(3)(B). 
47Ina § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii).
48hUman rIghts FIrst, denIaL and deLay: the ImpaCt oF the ImmIgratIon LaW’s “terrorIsm Bars” on asyLUm seekers and reFUgees In the UnIted
states 19-20 (2009), available at www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/rpp-denialanddelay-FULL-111009-web.pdf. 
49Ina § 212(a)(3)(B)(vi).
50Ina § 212(a)(3)(B)(vi).
51The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 allowed the secretaries of dos and dhs, in consultation with each other and with the attorney general, to waive the
“material support” grounds of inadmissibility to tier III terrorist organizations, provided that the organization had not engaged in terrorist activity against the Us or
another democratic country and had not “purposefully engaged in a pattern or practice of terrorist activity […] directed at civilians.” 
52Ina §212 (a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI). 
53Ina § 208(b)(1)(B)(i).
54Ina § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii).
substantial delays result from the sao process when the name of an intending refugee approximates or matches a
name in a government database. In such a case, the Us department of state (dos) or another federal agency must
ensure that the intending refugee is not the person listed in the database.  In the meantime, the screened refugee,
his or her family, and others with links to the case remain in dangerous situations for extended periods.44
rather than streamline the sao process, dhs initiated an additional security screening process, the inter-agency
check (IaC), in February 2011.  While only certain refugees are subject to the sao, all refugees receive the IaC.  the
new procedure has both led to significant delays in admissions and has exposed refugees to a cycle of additional
delays due to lapsed sao checks, medical examinations and interviews. dos officials estimated that as of July 2011
nearly 70,000 approved refugees awaited clearance to travel to the United states.
USa paTRioT act and Real id act
the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 and the REAL ID Act of 2005 significantly expanded the grounds of inadmissibility
based on “terrorist activity.”45 Under current law, a non-citizen is inadmissible for committing an act that he or she
knew or should have known afforded “material support” to a “terrorist organization” or to “terrorist activity.”46 the
Ina expansively defines each of these three terms. 
a terrorist activity can be unlawful under the laws where it was committed or under Us federal or state law.  It re-
quires “intent to endanger … one or more individuals or to cause substantial damage to property.”47 this language
has been interpreted to cover “virtually any use of armed force by a non-state actor, directed at anyone or any-
thing, for any purpose other than personal enrichment.”48
a “terrorist organization” need not be formally designated as such by the federal government.49 “tier III” groups
consist of “two or more individuals, whether organized or not” that engage in “terrorist activity.”50 they include
groups that opposed repressive and genocidal regimes. according to federal officials, an-inter-agency working
group is reviewing delayed cases involving support to more than 300 “terrorist” organizations.51
“material support” can entail providing “a safe house, transportation, communications, funds, transfer of funds or
other material financial benefit, false documentation or identification, weapons (including chemical, biological, or
radiological weapons), explosives, or training.”52 Because the material support bar does not turn on intent, level of
support, or the type of regime opposed, it has been used to deny protection to victims of terror and other human
rights violations.  
the reaL Id act of 2005 required that asylum applicants establish that race, religion, nationality, social group mem-
bership, or political opinion “was and will be at least one central reason” for their persecution.53 It also added the
requirement that asylum-seekers produce corroborating evidence of “otherwise credible testimony,” unless they do
not have or cannot reasonably obtain such evidence.54 many refugees and asylum-seekers cannot prove the mo-
tives of their persecutors or conclusively document their claims. the new requirements make it far more difficult to
prevail in these circumstances.
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prior to 2007, the Board of Immigration appeals (BIa) had defined a “social group” as one whose members “share
a common, immutable characteristic” that they could not or should not required to change “because it is funda-
mental to their individual identities or consciences.”55 In 2007, the BIa held that a social group must also possess a
sufficient degree of “social visibility.”56 Because many persecuted groups understandably seek to maintain a low
profile, this requirement presents an additional barrier to securing asylum in relevant cases. 
The US asylum system 
the Us system of refugee protection rests on the ability of persons fleeing persecution to access Us territory. yet
post-9/11 immigration-related security measures, combined with border enforcement and interdiction policies,
prevent untold numbers of asylum-seekers from reaching the United states.57
since 9/11, the United states has: 
• entered various agreements to share national security and law enforcement information;
• improved the integrity of Us passports and promoted passport security standards internationally;
• required most applicants for nonimmigrant visas to submit to in-person consular interviews; 
• required visa free travelers to obtain pre-travel authorization; 
• expanded the Us Visitor and Immigrant status Indicator technology program (Us-VIsIt), which biometrically
screens visa applicants, temporary visitors, and lawful permanent residents against criminal and terrorist 
databases; and,
• expanded the Border patrol and invested in border enforcement technology.58
these measures have advanced security and reduced illegal migration. yet persons fleeing persecution must often
resort to using false travel documents. others cross the border illegally or obtain temporary visas but do not in-
tend to return home. the above measures have made it far more difficult to access these “illegal” pathways, thus
contributing to significant declines in asylum filings since 9/11. dhs/UsCIs does not consistently report on affirma-
tive asylum filings. however, asylum claims in the immigration court system nosedived between Fy 2002 (74,634)
and Fy 2010 (32,961).59 over the same period, total affirmative and defensive asylum grants fell from 36, 923 to
21,113.60 
Conclusion
In summary, the response to the 9/11 attacks both improved security and hastened the erosion of Us refugee pro-
tection policies post-1980.  In addition, new protection mechanisms have not been created to mitigate the effects
of these measures. among the major developments:
• security reviews have left bona fide refugees and their families in dangerous situations for protracted periods.
• Interdiction policies, expedited removal, post-9/11 visa controls and other immigration-related security 
measures prevent asylum-seekers from reaching territorial protection.
• the one-year filing deadline, new corroboration requirements, and a stricter definition of social group 
membership have prevented asylum-seekers from prevailing in their cases. 
• security-related grounds of inadmissibility have delayed and denied protection to persons who opposed 
repressive regimes or were compelled to support terrorist groups. 
55Matter of Acosta, 19 I&n dec. 211, 233 (BIa 1985).
56In re A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I&n dec. 69, 74 (BIa 2007).
57VInCent ChetaIL & CÉLIne BaULoZ, the eUropean UnIon and the ChaLLenges oF ForCed mIgratIon: From eConomIC CrIsIs to proteCtIon CrIsIs? 4-
10 (2011), available at http://www.eui.eu/projects/transatlanticproject/documents/Backgroundpapers/eU-Ushumanrights.pdf.   a pillar of the Common european
asylum system has been to prevent access to eU territory, and to contain refugees in developing countries where 80 percent of the world’s refugees reside. this goal
has been accomplished through visa controls, interception programs, safe-third country practices, and weighing asylum claims abroad.  
58sUsan gInsBUrg, seCUrIng hUman moBILIty In the age oF rIsk: neW ChaLLenges For traVeL, mIgratIon, and Borders (2010).  See also susan gins-
burg, mpI senior nonresident Fellow, presentation at mpI: securing human mobility in the age of risk: new Challenges for travel, migration, and Borders (apr. 22,
2010), available at http://my.migrationpolicy.org/p/salsa/event/common/public/?event_key=21243. 
59U.s. dep’t of Justice (doJ), executive office for Immigration review (eoIr), Fy 2005 statistical yearbook 12 (2006)
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy05syb.pdf ; doJ, eoIr, Fy 2010 statistical year Book, l1.
60dhs, supra note 42, at table 16; danIeL C.martIn, U.s. dep’t oF homeLand seCUrIty, oFFICe oF ImmIgratIon statIstICs, reFUgees and asyLees: 2010, 5
(2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_rfa_fr_2010.pdf.
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The Department of Homeland Security has a vital mission: to secure the nation from the many threats we face. This
requires the dedication of more than 230,000 employees in jobs that range from aviation and border security to
emergency response, from cybersecurity analyst to chemical facility inspector. Our duties are wide-ranging, but our
goal is clear – keeping America safe.  A safe and secure homeland means more than preventing terrorist attacks
from being carried out. We must also ensure that civil rights and civil liberties remain secure. 
The Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL),62 which is part of the Office of the Secretary, supports the De-
partment’s mission to secure the Nation while preserving individual liberty, fairness, and equality under the law.
CRCL integrates civil rights and civil liberties into all the Department’s activities: 
• Promoting respect for civil rights and civil liberties in policy creation and implementation by advising 
Department 
leadership and personnel, and state and local partners. 
• Communicating with individuals and communities whose civil rights and civil liberties may be affected by 
Department activities, informing them about policies and avenues of redress, and promoting appropriate 
attention within the Department to their experiences and concerns. 
• Investigating and resolving civil rights and civil liberties complaints filed by the public regarding Department
policies or activities, or actions taken by Department personnel. 
• Leading the Department’s equal employment opportunity programs and promoting workforce diversity 
and merit system principles. 
CRCL has helped the Department advance civil rights and civil liberties by: 
• Providing advice and support for incorporation of civil rights and civil liberties protections into the 
Department’s immigration-related activities and policies. 
• Ensuring that the Department’s intelligence, security, and information sharing activities comply with 
Constitutional, statutory, regulatory, and other requirements relating to civil rights and civil liberties. 
• Investigating complaints alleging abuses of civil rights or civil liberties, including racial, ethnic, or religious 
profiling. 
• Conducting civil rights and civil liberties impact assessments to improve the civil rights protections afforded 
by Department programs, policies, and activities. 
• Delivering targeted and effective training to assist Department personnel to fulfill their roles and complete 
their missions while respecting civil rights and civil liberties. 
• Engaging with diverse communities throughout the country to raise awareness about CRCL’s mission and 
function, and serving as an entry point for individuals and groups to raise issues of concern with DHS. 
KAREEM SHORA
SENIOR POLICY ADVISOR, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY61
The 9/11 Effect and its Legacy on U.S. Immigration Laws
Penn State Law, September 16, 2011
61Kareem Shora, Senior Policy Advisor/Section Lead, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL), Remarks:  The 9/11 Effect and
its Legacy on U.S. Immigration Laws (Sept. 16, 2011). 
62U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL), http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/crcl.shtm.
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• Supporting resilience to natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other emergencies by ensuring federal 
emergency management planning and response fully incorporate the perspectives and needs of diverse 
populations, across demographic groups and disabilities. 
• Leading the Department’s efforts to implement proactive and effective programs for equal employment 
opportunity and diversity. 
Public engagement with diverse American communities whose civil rights and civil liberties may be affected by DHS
activities is a priority for CRCL. Our Community Engagement Section responds to community concerns and provides
information on DHS programs, activities, and issues by building trust and establishing a routine process for commu-
nication and coordination with diverse community leaders and organizations. 
The goals of our community engagement program are to: 
• Communicate and share reliable information about Federal programs and policies, including avenues for 
redress and complaints; 
• Obtain information and feedback about community concerns and on-the-ground impacts of DHS activities;
• Incorporate community ideas and issues relating to civil rights and civil liberties into the policymaking 
process;
• Deepen channels of communication between communities, regional DHS leadership and other federal of
officials in order to facilitate solution of problems.
CRCL is currently active with quarterly roundtable meetings in thirteen metropolitan areas: Washington, DC;
Chicago, IL; Los Angeles, CA; Boston, MA; Detroit, MI; Columbus, OH; Seattle, WA; Atlanta, GA; Minneapolis, MN;
Tampa, FL; Houston, TX, Denver, CO, and Portland, ME.  This activity consists of leading quarterly roundtable meet-
ings among diverse community leaders representing the Latino, Asian/Asian Pacific Islander, South Asian, Arab,
Muslim, and African communities and Federal, State, and local government officials.  Townhalls and stand-alone
engagement events throughout the country and internationally allow CRCL to magnify its reach beyond its regular
roundtables.  CRCL also leads efforts to improve the cultural competency of DHS personnel and its federal, state,
local, and tribal partners. The Office has developed training resources including the use of religious garments and
articles. CRCL also leads a training program for Federal, State, and local law enforcement, which aims to improve
communication, build trust, and encourage collaboration between officers and the communities they serve and
protect. 
U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, asylum seekers, refugees, non-immigrant and immigrant visa holders, mi-
grant workers, undocumented persons, and persons in detention are all affected by DHS immigration-related pro-
grams. CRCL works with DHS component offices and agencies to: 
• Ensure that civil rights and civil liberties protections are incorporated into immigration-related programs, 
policies, and procedures throughout the Department; 
• Communicate with and inform the public about the civil and human rights and civil liberties implications of DHS 
immigration programs, policies and procedures – including individual rights and responsibilities; and 
• Provide civil and human rights and civil liberties training to DHS component agencies. 
CRCL advises DHS leadership on a range of issues at the nexus of immigration and civil rights law and policy. CRCL
reviews existing programs, provides policy recommendations and other guidance to ensure compliance with civil
rights laws, creates training materials, educates the public, works to ensure equal access, and facilitates dialogue
between and among government agencies and immigration and civil rights organizations. 
• State and Local Immigration Enforcement Programs: We work closely with ICE to monitor its various 
partnerships with state and local law enforcement, including Secure Communities and the 287(g) program. 
• Worksite Immigration Issues: We engage with stakeholders and work with other components to troubleshoot
issues at the intersection of immigration enforcement and civil rights and civil liberties protections for those
who work in the United States. 
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o Verification Databases and Programs: E-Verify and the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements 
(SAVE) program may affect people’s ability to work and their eligibility for public benefits at the local, state, 
and federal levels. We actively review these programs’ monitoring and compliance products and system de
sign. We also co-produced educational videos and written outreach material for employers and workers 
about E-Verify. For more information about this program, please visit: www.uscis.gov/e-verify or 
www.uscis.gov/save.  
• Human Rights and Vulnerable Populations: CRCL is the DHS single point of contact for international human
rights treaty reporting and coordination. We work with federal agencies and departments to ensure that 
human rights are considered in policy and programs. We have developed and advanced protective policies 
and procedures for victims of torture and persecution, battered women, and trafficked persons, among others. 
• Conditions of Immigration Detention: We work with ICE to design and implement detention reforms that 
better protect the civil and human rights of immigrant detainees. Reforms include: an online detainee 
locator system, enhanced alternatives to detention, improved risk assessment tools, better medical care 
and medical classification of detainees, and Performance-Based National Detention Standards (PBNDS) for 
detention facilities. We also offer civil rights and civil liberties training for detention services managers.
• Access to DHS Programs and Activities: We work across the Department to ensure that individuals 
encountering language, cultural, and literacy barriers can access DHS activities, including, but not limited to, 
immigration proceedings, detention information, and disaster relief services. 
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Reflections on Immigration Enforcement and National Security Ten Years Later
Hindsight is 20/20 and conferences such as this are critically important in reviewing where we have made errors or
poor judgments in the past.  It’s appropriate that we should use these reflective opportunities so we can address
vulnerabilities, change course where we have been misguided, and generally consider the lessons learned.  When it
comes to the issue of immigration enforcement in the post-9/11 environment, it’s clear that many decisions were
made that may not have been prudent. 
However, there are many areas in which the events of 9/11 sharpened our focus and improved the general effec-
tiveness of U.S. law enforcement by more fully integrating immigration violations into other significant law enforce-
ment investigations, and more directly addressing the potential vulnerabilities in our immigration system.  This
occurred through organizational improvements to the enforcement of immigration laws, as well as the develop-
ment of terrorism and national security-specific initiatives.
When assessing changes made due to national security concerns, it is important to remember the context of the
challenge we collectively feared and faced on 9/11, and shortly thereafter. The brutal attacks to our country and
the flagrant abuses of our immigration system caused widespread concern about our country’s ability to effectively
enforce immigration laws, and widespread frustration about our inability to prevent the horrific loss of life on that
day.
Some discussions of post-9/11 changes to immigration enforcement downplay the extent of immigration and docu-
ment fraud violations committed by the 9/11 hijackers.  There were many failures of government related to this cat-
astrophic event, but few are as clearly recognizable as the failure of the integrity of our immigration system leading
up to the events.  The 9/11 Staff Report on Terrorist Travel succinctly identifies this shortcoming.  As stated in the
report: 
We endeavor to dispel the myth that [the hijackers’] entry into the United States was ‘clean and legal.’ It was not.
Three hijackers carried passports with indicators of Islamic extremism linked to al Qaeda; two others carried pass-
ports manipulated in a fraudulent manner. It is likely that several more hijackers carried passports with similar
fraudulent manipulation. Two hijackers lied on their visa applications. Once in the United States, two hijackers vio-
lated the terms of their visas. One overstayed his visa. And all but one obtained some form of state identification.
We know that six of the hijackers used these state issued identifications to check in for their flights on September
11.  Three of them were fraudulently obtained.63 
JULIE MYERS WOOD
PRESIDENT, ICS CONSULTING, LLC 
AND IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS SOLUTIONS, LLC
FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY, UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
The 9/11 Effect and its Legacy on U.S. Immigration Laws
Penn State Law, September 16, 2011
63NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, 9/11 AND TERRORIST TRAVEL:  STAFF REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, Preface (2004), available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/staff_statements/911_TerrTrav_Monograph.pdf.
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While I fully acknowledge that there were many areas where our reaction to 9/11 may have been imperfect, my re-
marks today will highlight just a few of the organizational and programmatic changes made to immigration enforce-
ment after 9/11 where I think we acted prudently, and discuss next steps for the enforcement community.
Selected Organizational Improvements
Prior to 9/11, the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s (INS) law enforcement authorities were not fully inte-
grated with other law enforcement agencies.  The INS itself was part of the Department of Justice (DOJ).  It had a
multi-purpose mission, with a Commissioner tasked with increasing services and improving the flow of legal immi-
grants into the United States especially in the late 90’s in response to an economy hungry for eligible workers.  At
the same time, the INS was working under increasing scrutiny with regards to their mandate to keep illegal immi-
grants from coming across the border illegally and investigating internal immigration issues, complicating success in
this area.  
Despite the international nature of the work, the INS had a somewhat limited overseas presence, focused primarily
on refugee processing, and service-type tasks.  The overseas positions were not classified as Special Agent (1811)
positions, and as such, generally did not involve significant investigative work. 
The INS was reorganized as a result of the legislative creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).64
The service responsibilities of the INS primarily went to the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS).  The Border Patrol and inspectors from the INS were combined with the customs inspectors to form United
States Customs and Border Protection (CBP), although the Border Patrol remained a distinct entity.  The INS Special
Agents, attorneys, intelligence analysts and detention and removal officers were combined with the Special Agents
from the United States Customs Service (USCS) into a new agency, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).65 
The organizational changes affected the culture and the substantive work done by INS employees.  The changes
were not always easy, particularly on the law enforcement side.  DHS as a whole was described as building an air-
plane while flying it.  The ICE merger has often been described as a shotgun marriage of two agencies (USCS and
INS) in which each had strong reservations about the entire thing.  
Despite the difficulties, many of these organizational changes brought real improvement to the enforcement mis-
sion. For example, the ICE merger brought about some immediate improvement in terms of addressing national se-
curity vulnerabilities and also provided long term potential for improvements as well.  More specifically, with the
ICE merger, there was now one investigative agency that had all the customs authorities, including expertise on
money laundering and financial transactions, and an agency that had all the immigration authorities.  ICE Special
Agents were cross-trained on all the legacy authorities and ICE soon began utilizing a mixture of authorities to best
address cross-border threats.  This caused an increase in effectiveness when pursuing various types of investiga-
tions.  For example, in international smuggling investigations, ICE agents began to add forfeiture and money laun-
dering counts to the smuggling indictments.  This was rarely, if ever done, prior to the creation of ICE.  Adding a
financial target was effective because these criminals were motivated by financial gain.   Similarly, on the other
side, ICE agents began looking at administrative immigration charges to help dismantle gang organizations or drug
organizations. This type of approach was rarely pursued before, as USCS agents were not trained in the use of ad-
ministrative immigration authorities and often hesitant to bring in other agencies.
As part of the organizational shift, ICE also established foreign attaché offices headed by Special Agents.  These Spe-
cial Agents could conduct or oversee appropriate investigations, using both the customs and immigration authori-
ties available to ICE.  This investigative focus strengthened the ability of the attaché offices to support significant
ICE national security and other investigations. 
64DHS was created by the passage of the Homeland Security Act in November 2002, and opened its doors on March 1, 2003.  The INS components were merged into
DHS the same year. 
65ICE also assumed responsibility for the student visa program, the Student Exchange Visitors Program (SEVP), as well as the humanitarian parole program.  The hu-
manitarian parole program later was transferred over to USCIS.
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Selected Terrorism-Specific Program Improvements
In addition to organizational changes, the INS, and then ICE developed and implemented a number of investigative
programs to address potential vulnerabilities in the immigration system.  Many of these programs focused on ICE’s
role in prohibiting terrorist travel to address vulnerabilities identified on 9/11.  
The investigative programs included the Visa Security Program (VSP).  The Visa Security Program places ICE person-
nel overseas to work directly with the Department of State Consular Affairs officers to help screen visa applicants.
Integrating ICE agents at the front end of the application process helps ensure that fewer potential threats are ad-
mitted to the United States.  VSP officers are on the ground at high-risk locations and able to assess risks and con-
duct targeted investigations where needed.  Currently, the VSP has 19 posts in 15 high-risk locations.  ICE has a
strategic plan to expand the VSPs, but this plan has not been fully executed. One of the challenges in expanding
the VSPs has been some resistance from the State Department, and needless turf and office space battles. 
In addition, the failure of an appropriate exit system to track visa overstays was highlighted by the 9/11 failures.
Although there is not a comprehensive exit system in place, ICE developed a number of methods to more closely
track visa overstays, and a dedicated unit to focus on high-risk overstays.  This unit is able to focus on national se-
curity and other risks, as defined by the intelligence agencies or other investigative partners.  ICE and DHS are con-
tinuing to improve the information provided to ICE to timely track high-risk visa overstays.
Other programmatic steps taken since 9/11 included the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center (HSTC), which is
an interagency center that shares intelligence regarding human smuggling and illicit and terrorist travel.  The cen-
ter prepares strategic assessments and broadly disseminates open source information.  ICE also partnered with the
Criminal Division at the Department of Justice in the creation of the Extraterritorial Criminal Travel Strike Force,
which focuses on the prosecution and apprehension of high-level criminal organizational targets.
In addition, after 9/11 there was a fuller integration of the INS and then ICE agents into the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs).  In supporting the JTTFs, ICE agents are able to actively work high
priority terrorism and national security cases.  In addition, in supporting the JTTF, on some occasions ICE is able to
utilize administrative authorities to bring effective enforcement actions against significant targets for which there
was not an existing criminal case. This does not always mean that the charges were brought as terrorism charges.
Instead, in many instances, routine charges of visa fraud or overstaying visas were brought against national secu-
rity risks.  This further highlights the benefits of expanded authorities held by individual agents.
Finally, for a number of years after the creation of DHS, ICE also implemented a national security strategy that in-
cluded an emphasis on “routine” enforcement.  As part of a layered enforcement strategy, the goal was to ensure
that illegal immigrants could not be sure that they were escaping authorities at any time.
Ensuring Effective Immigration Enforcement Going Forward
To effectively attack transnational crime, protect national security and prevent terrorism, immigration authorities
must be utilized smartly.  Ten years after 9/11, it is appropriate to assess the steps that have been taken, both or-
ganizational and specific, and identify what is working, what is not working, and what the intelligence suggests the
law enforcement community should be targeting. It would be unwise to ignore the connections to national security
and vulnerabilities posed by misuse of our immigration system.  Over the past few years, Al Qaeda has changed its
tactics, with an emphasis on smaller scale attacks and utilizing more U.S. citizens as a way to avoid detection.
Other terrorist and criminal organizations also continue to utilize weak points within the immigration system.  
ICE should continuously reassess intelligence and threat streams to determine whether any particular category of
visa holders or method of illegal entry is of highest risk, and initiate targeted investigative initiatives to address
those.  The evaluation of the effectiveness of these initiatives should be an ongoing process.  Given the agency’s
limited resources, it is important not to blindly continue with initiatives that do not show results. On some occa-
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sions, the government has known that a prospective program has not produced significant useful results, like the
National Security Exit and Entry Registration Service (NSEERS), and yet the government has kept the program in
place for years after its arguable initial usefulness had expired. 
At the same time, given the changing methods of criminal organizations, it is important not to pin law enforce-
ment’s focus solely to overly targeted methods that may not reach the mark, while ignoring other methods that
might ensure the integrity of the immigration system and serve as an additional layer of protection. 
One example of this is the current focus of ICE regarding previously convicted criminal aliens. It is critical that the
agency continue a strong focus on convicted criminals.  However, as the examples of the 9/11 hijackers show, many
individuals who may want to cause harm to the United States may not be previously convicted criminals. The Ad-
ministration has issued guidance that provides that illegal immigrants who have committed crimes only relating to
their entry and illegal stay in the United States may be excused from deportation and obtain work authorization in
certain cases.66 This guidance could cover individuals like several of the 9/11 hijackers, who “merely” lied to obtain
state identification documents or on their visa applications.  The idea that routine immigration or documentation
violations should be ignored, or considered insignificant poses a potentially serious threat to our system.  It sends a
message to those that seek to cause harm:  if they can come in the United States illegally, but not commit any addi-
tional crimes, they are likely to be left alone.  Left alone to plan, take steps, cause harm.   This explicit movement
away from the New York policing model of addressing small and large violations – where even the turnstile jumpers
were held accountable – should be closely watched as it may have broad implications for the ability of law enforce-
ment to effectively prevent serious abuses in the immigration system. 
Despite some of the positive improvements to our immigration enforcement efforts implemented after 9/11, many
people are frustrated by the perception that all these efforts have caused the United States to become a less-invit-
ing nation.  In many respects, our immigration policy is bi-polar, lacking a clear sense of our nation’s priorities and
values.  It’s not the law enforcement agents who are merely seeking to more effectively enforce the laws on our
books that are to blame, but rather the legislators that allow for such a dysfunctional system to exist.  We need to
pressure our legislators to consider sensible steps to expand legal immigration into the U.S. to correspond to the re-
alities of our needs and national values.  At the same time, having served at the highest levels of the Department of
Homeland Security, I am keenly aware of the ongoing threats to our national security and the vulnerabilities within
our immigration system.  We can and must have a strong immigration enforcement strategy that focuses on na-
tional security and restoring integrity to the immigration laws on our books.  But we cannot rely on enforcement
alone. Without a meaningful consideration for other sensible immigration reform, to include a more welcoming
stance, we risk projecting an image of an unwelcoming nation – which could be another tragic outcome of the 9/11
era. 
66The actual effects of this guidance may vary considerably; as DHS has not yet issued guidelines that fully state who will qualify under the policy and who will not.
Reasonably drafted guidelines may mitigate some of the concern identified here. 
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Phantoms of Lost Liberty
I first started investigating immigrant detention back in the summer of 1993, in the time immediately after the ship
Golden Venture ran aground on a beach in Queens carrying close to 300 Chinese immigrants – another pivotal New York
event that also altered both the rhetoric and landscape of immigration policy. Working as a freelance photojournalist for
newsmagazines at the time, I began photographing along the California/Mexico border covering the Border Patrol and
deportations, and even made brief visits inside detention centers.  But ultimately media interest seemed largely confined
to southern border issues (and the occasional stray ship), and the matter, or at least my coverage of it, seemed to lan-
guish.
It wasn’t until 1999 when the issue returned to become a central focus for my lens. First researching the topic in journal-
istic accounts I was immediately struck by the size and severity of the issue, as well as by the immensity of the problems
surrounding the government agency in charge at the time - the Immigration and Naturalization Service, or INS. Reading in
media publications about the detention of asylum seekers, unaccompanied minors and other detainees, I was also sur-
prised by how few of these articles included actual photographs of immigrants in detention. The text was there and was
often quite compelling, but photographs were noticeably absent, and, in my view, sorely lacking. Seeing this void, and
sensing the need for persuasive photographic documentation to help bring the issue to light, I secured funding from the
Open Society Institute and set about trying to gain access to be able to photograph on this topic across the country. 
Little did I realize at the time that one of the main reasons there were so few photographs accompanying these articles
was because it was so difficult to get in with a camera to take them.
Outside cameras rarely if ever go inside where most detainees are held. That was true then and remains true today. My
entrance required lengthy, repeated, occasionally exasperating and often futile negotiations with press officers with the
immigration service or with county jails. Occasionally, I would have to deal with both bureaucratic layers simultaneously,
an experience bordering on the Kafkaesque. When permitted, access was normally restricted to meeting with a detainee
inside a small room normally used for attorney-client meetings within a detention facility. Typically, the room would have
white walls, a desk and two chairs, and would offer no visual hint whatsoever that one was sitting inside a detention cen-
ter or jail. Time allowed to photograph inside these rooms was also frequently limited. Little wonder so many of the arti-
cles were all text and no photos. 
Working under such restrictions presented many challenges, not the least of which was the difficulty posed in “docu-
menting” detainees in this decontextualized and sanitized environment. On occasion, my short leash would be stretched
a little, allowing a slightly expanded view of detainee life beyond the interview room. But the leash was never fully re-
moved. While the difficulties and frustrations I faced in gaining access to detention facilities with a camera were many,
the testimonies I encountered once inside reminded me that no matter how difficult it was for me to get in, it was always
far more difficult for detainees to get out – or, more precisely, to be released from detention in a manner that did not in-
volve a one-way trip on an airplane back to the far away land of their birth.
STEVEN RUBIN67
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If it was extremely difficult to gain entry to photograph inside detention centers prior to 9/11, it became impossible to do
so afterwards, at least in the short term. My prior requests to obtain admittance were suddenly put on indefinite hold.
New requests were summarily denied. I was informed there were now other priorities. In the words of Attorney General
John Ashcroft, “a new paradigm” had arrived. 
Ten years hence it’s hard to summon the authentic political atmosphere of the period immediately following the attacks,
or even to faithfully recall much of the emotion and language expressed at the time. However, what has never faded from
my memory, at least, are the words Attorney General Ashcroft spoke before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Decem-
ber 6, 2001. Lashing out at critics of the administration's response to immigrants and terrorism, he warned: 
"…to those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty, my message is this: 
Your tactics only aid terrorists."…
Like other members of the media, I was not permitted to photograph the thousands of men, mostly of Arab and South
Asian origin, who were rounded up and held in secretive federal custody for weeks and months in the immediate after-
math of the attacks of September 11. Nor was I able to photograph those held for additional months even after a court
ordered their immediate release. But what I did photograph in the pre- 9/11 period, as well as during the years after 9/11
(once I was able finally to gain limited access again) form a body of work selections of which I present here. The images
include a mother and her children impacted by the detention of her husband – the children’s father and the family’s main
breadwinner – and the fallout from his deportation to Lebanon. They include a Pakistani family protesting the disappear-
ance of their loved one outside the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn. They portray asylum seekers in detention
prior to 9/11 whose cases became complicated and prolonged by the crackdown following that day. They include por-
traits of detainees relatively unaffected by 9/11 but whose cases exemplify some of the severe problems in the detention
system that existed prior to that date and that remain problematic to this day. 
These images aim to put a face on the staggeringly large numbers of detainees (estimated now at around 400,000 per
year), and to help make their situations less deniable and more real. Ultimately, they challenge Ashcroft’s insistence that
concerns about the degradation of civil liberties serve only to support terrorists and are but empty and delusional
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For Mr. Scherfen:
You received an honorable discharge from the United States Army in 2006, about 5 years following the Septem-
ber 11, 2001 attacks.  In those intervening years, did you ever feel that your religion factored into your treatment
as a member of the armed forces?
Yes.  There were 2 Muslim flight officers in my Attack Helicopter Battalion, an African American Muslim and myself.
He saw the trouble coming and managed to work his way out of the military by early 2002.   I stayed on until they
began to target me and my practice of religion. 
However, later on, I received 2 visits form the FBI (and not Army CID) while training for the AH-64 Apache at Fort
Rucker, AL in January 2002.  On the first visit   they said, "We heard from someone up your way that you have some
information about 9/11 and we would like to hear about it." As is my right, I refused to answer their questions and
instead started explaining what Islam really is supposed to be. I even gave them a PBS DVD on the subject as a gift.
They left.  
Later on (like US Army Captain and Muslim-James Yee) I was accused of passing sensitive information to an Egypt-
ian Colonel that was living next door to me on the US army base.  That was the most embarrassing, and potentially
fatal accusation they made, since I was the Apache class leader and everyone in my class knew about it.  What
made this claim more ridiculous was that the Egyptian colonel was in class at Fort Rucker to be an Apache instruc-
tor, and in a more advanced version of the helicopter than I was to fly in the National Guard.  I had nothing to offer.
As a result, I received another visit form the FBI.  Again, I said nothing but a friendly greeting.   
For Ms. Tareen:
You emigrated to the U.S. from Pakistan at a fairly young age.  You later naturalized to a U.S. citizen. How have
your experiences with the “no fly” lists changed your views of the United States or decision to naturalize?   
It hasn’t changed my decision to naturalize. I am still happy with my decision to be an American citizen.  Unfortu-
nately, there are no utopias in this world. I have many criticisms of this country but, for the most part, I am able to
voice those criticisms. I wouldn’t be able to do that in Pakistan. Plus, Pakistan is basically in a state of War right
now, there are still drone attacks happening by the US.  
When you talked about your experiences to your friends and family outside of the United States, what was their
reaction? Did your experiences raise doubts in their minds about the United States’ commitment immigration
policies after 9/11?
PLENARY Q&A WITH 
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68Erich Scherfen & Rubina Tareen, Plenary Q&A:  The 9/11 Effect and its Legacy on U.S. Immigration Laws (Sept. 16, 2011).
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After 9/11, I sponsored my sister and her son in their applications for permanent legal residence in the United
States.  When they went through the interview process, my sister said it was more of an interrogation than an in-
terview. She and her son were detained for a whole day when they came. After receiving the visa and coming to
the states they decided not to settle here because they felt like they were already suspects. My nephew has actu-
ally refused to come back to the States because of that experience. 
On the other hand, my brother applied for immigration and had absolutely no problems. He was never interro-
gated nor detained and enjoys living in the States. When I reflect on the difference between these two cases the
only discrepancy I can find between 2 people, who lived under the same roof in Pakistan and know the same peo-
ple, is that my sister is religious and my brother is very secular. 
For Mr. Scherfen & Ms. Tareen:
Where were you and your family on September 11, 2011?
SCHERFEN: Ironically, as the last US Army pilot trained on the AH-1(f) Cobra, I was to fly out of my Army National
Guard Base at Mercer County Airport (in Trenton,NJ) with reporters and camera men from ABC news New York,
who were covering the last flights of the iconic, 2nd-generation attack helicopter from the Vietnam War.  Ironi-
cally, our flight was going to be to the Lakehurst practice area, the scene of another big air disaster of the 1930s:
Nazi Germany's Hindenburg crash.  
I zipped up my flight suit, got in my car and headed toward Trenton.  I listened to CBS 880am for a traffic report to
avoid the notorious Jersey traffic jams.  That 's when I heard that a plane had struck one of the World Trade Tow-
ers.  After I heard the second plane had hit, I stopped and called into my Battalion headquarters.  The Sergent on
duty at the flight line was breaking down. She told me, "Stand down, don't come in.  Nobody but active duty Air
Force is allowed in the air.  We just tried to send a UH-60 Medivac out from the base to aid the NYFD but they
were intercepted by F-15s from God-knows Where and were contacted on "guard frequency" and told to land im-
mediately...or they would be shot down.  The ABC news crew just ripped their camera equipment off the helicop-
ter and sped away before we even knew what happened.  We will call you if we need you!" 
I went home and listened to all the details on the radio.  For the first time in my life, the skies over the busiest air-
space in the world were eerily quiet, with the exception of a low flying fighter jet.  Nobody knew who did it yet.
But I was worried for the Muslim half of my family and sped home.  
What is a “no-fly” list? How did you come to learn that you were on the “no-fly” list?  Have your experiences
with the “no fly” lists and this lawsuit had a negative impact on your willingness to be active members of the Is-
lamic community?
SCHERFEN: I wish I really knew what a no-fly list is, or how you get on it, and how you get off of it.  But it seems to
have different levels.  In 2006, My family and I had a 4 hour detention on the ground at the US-Canadian DHS bor-
der check point. The DHS agents surrounded us at the tollbooth and forced my family out of our SUV.  With their
hands on their guns, the DHS agents marched us to a detention center.  They took our car and went trough all of
our stuff.   We were all questioned and eventually released, not knowing why we were stopped or why they released
us if we were so dangerous.
I asked one officer why they had to do all of this, they didn't know.  They gave me a DHS TRIP form that you can
use to file a claim to get you off the list.  When I got back home, I filed the form and was given a "control number"
and told it would be looked into.   
Some time passed and I had no problem.  I applied for my first airline job in 2007 and was hired. As part of my du-
ties as a pilot, I would have to go to an airport and pick up a plane and reposition it for flight in another airport. To
get from place to place, I had to "dead-head" fly as a passenger, sometimes on other airlines, but paid for by my
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airline.  I would have to show up in uniform with my airport ID and be ready for work.  This was smooth until about
3 months after I was hired.  I couldn't seem to deadhead with out a lot of trouble at the ticket counter.  Usually it
meant just a check of my Airport ID and one other form of ID, and sometimes they asked me for my birthday.  The
wait started getting longer and longer, but I was still flying.  My wife was also getting stopped more.  Then, on the
last day of April 2008, on the way back from a flight from Washington Dulles Airport (following from my diary):
I arrived at home and checked the phone messages.  I noticed there were an unusually high number of calls from
the 703 area code, probably my airline’s Manassas Headquarters.  I usually would blow this off as an attempt by the
crew-scheduling department to get me to come in and work an extra flight.  I was advised by “street smart” people
in our company to avoid responding to these, and I did.  But just then another call came in from the 703 area code.
I looked at the caller ID it was Vice President Mary Finnagin, who you only get a call from if you’re in trouble. “Oh
no!” I thought as I tabbed through my mental rolodex of any possible “sins” I might of committed in the past 3 days
of flying and came up blank.  After a rough start to my airline career, I had finally felt comfortable and had few, if
any, complaints from the Captains I flew with. 
After a pause, I picked up the phone.      
“Hello”  
“Erich, this is Mary Finnagin from Colgan Air. I don’t know what is going on here, but our security officer Rob
Runion gave me a call just an hour ago and said that your name has appeared on a terrorist watch list.”
I paused, as I got my usual feverish, sweaty galvanic skin response going.
“Well…I don’t know what to say. I have had a few problems boarding flights on my deadhead employee travel, but
nothing that kicked me off any flight.”
“You really don’t seemed surprised,” Mary said with a bit of anger in her voice. And I did not know if that was anger
of accusation or anger at the system. Either way there was a problem.
Mary broke up the silence, “ I’m sorry, but you will have to go back to Allentown turn in your ID card…like right
now.  Since you haven’t taken a single sick day or any vacation since you been with us, I’m going to put you on paid
leave for the next 2 weeks while we try to sort this mess out. After that…well we’re going to have to let you go. Any
questions”
“No!”
“Well, with that said, I have our security coordinator Rob Runion on the line right now and he’d like to talk to you.
I‘ll put him on now…good luck!”
“Thanks.”
I heard the phone clicked as Mary transferred me over to Rob Runiun.
“Hi Erich, I guess you heard the bad news.  I’m sorry; we will do all that we can to fix this mess up. It seems that you
have been put on a list that I cannot even access, I don’t know how you got on it or even if your on it, but we run a
daily check of all the names on our data base against the DHS /TSA list and you came up hot. Were doing every-
thing we can, but for now, I need you to go back to Allentown and give Captain John Mac Elwy your ID card. I’m not
letting him go home till he gets it.”
I hung up the phone and reluctantly got in the car and made the long 50-minute drive back to Allentown.  I didn’t
want John, the father of 3 waiting any longer than he had to. That was my only motivation. He just wasn’t allowed
to leave before I gave him my airport ID.
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I arrived in the small employee parking lot in front of Allentown airport.  John Mc Elwy was waiting.  I got out of
the car and said my hellos.  He smiled then laughed and said jokingly, “What did you do?”
“I don’t know.” I said. “Maybe you could tell me.”
“Well, I don’t have a clue!” He said.  “I just have to take your ID card back to Manassas till this is cleared up. Sorry!
I knew of another guy at Cape Air... had the last name O’Brian… I think… out of a job for 6 months…they said he
matched a name of some Irish Republican Army fellow. Them Poor Irish! Well good luck with it all and keep me
posted. I’m real sorry!” 
We shook hand and got in our cars and drove off.  Despite being a bit of right winger, John Mc Elwy, who was one
of a few pilots who was aloud to carry a gun on board an airliner, was a lot kinder than I expected and very sympa-
thetic. In the circles of pilot gossip, I heard he continually blamed the company and TSA policy instead of me.  He
just couldn’t stereotype me as a terrorist.   — One Soldier's Story
SCHERFEN: As far as being more or less active in the Muslim community:  I have always been most active in the in-
terfaith community.  That helped, as it was a Rabbi that helped me get the ear of the ACLU.  And with all that has
happened, I have stepped up my efforts to educate people on my current faith group.  I have given speeches in
countless Churches, Synagogues, Civic, and Military organizations, including the Carlisle War College.  
TAREEN: Prior to 9/11, I was having trouble with traveling.  I took my mother to North Carolina to visit my sister in
2000, and I was taken off of the plane to be searched.  So being on any type of “watch list” has been an issue for
me before 9/11.  After 9/11, it was still bad.  I would require special screening through TSA lines and would be
questioned when I returned back to the states from a visit to Pakistan. 
That never prevented me from remaining active in the Muslim Community. It actually motivated me to be more
active so I can tell people about the trouble I receive and remind Muslims to be vigilant in making sure their civil
liberties are not violated.  
Do you believe your names still appear on a “List?”
SCHERFEN: Yes! But it must be at a lower level.  Now, when I "deadhead," the ticket counter only asks my birthday
and checks my drivers license.  Although they don't ask the other pilots for this information, I haven't been
stopped in any way since October of 2008   
TAREEN: I am stopped as part of general religious profiling at the TSA screening points because I wear a headscarf.
This, from my understanding, is standard procedure across the board for Seikhs, Nuns, Muslims or any one who
has something on their head that can't ordinarily be removed.  But on paper it appears my name is clear, for now. 
As you reflect on the 10-year anniversary of 9/11 what do you think are the most important lessons?  
TAREEN: I find it sad that in America, most immigrant groups have had their share of prejudice and persecution.
The Irish Catholics, the Japanese, the Chinese, they all had to get their share of difficulty before they got respect.
Unfortunately, not much has changed over the centuries. 
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National Security, International Terrorism and Immigration Policy: What Difference Has Ten Years Made?
The Arabic expression is ‘illifat mat,’ the past is dead. And so we would like to think about the worst of the post
9/11 policies rushed into place to combat terrorism that singled out Arabs and Muslims in the US and outside for
harsh and extraordinary treatment, including torture. The ‘special interest’ designations; the Absconder Apprehen-
sion Initiative; the Voluntary Interview programs; NSEERs; the immigration provisions of USAPA that resulted in the
detentions, interrogations, arrests or deportations of thousands of overwhelmingly Arab and Muslim foreign na-
tionals, even torture at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo—some say—are a thing of the past. Many of our foremost
legal scholars have argued that the worst is over, and the law has won. David Cole, in his just-published piece in the
NYRB, states: “one of the most important lessons of the past decade may be that the rule of law, seemingly so vul-
nerable in the attacks’ aftermath, proved far more resilient than many would have predicted.”70 I beg to differ, pre-
ferring the sagacity of Faulkner: “the past is never dead, it’s not even past.” 
In the book, Civil Rights in Peril, Kevin Johnson, myself and other authors argued back in 2004 that the targeting of
Arabs and Muslims in the US for discriminatory, unconstitutional and harmful treatment began before 9/11, and
that it was closely tied to US foreign policy. In response to the government’s post-9/11 claims that new ‘anti-terror-
ist’ measures targeted only non-immigrants who, like some in the Arab/Muslim communities posed a particular
threat, in our article in 2005, Maritza Karmely and I traced the combination of publicized and lesser-known meas-
ures that clearly targeted Arabs and Muslims both non-citizens and citizens to prove that unlawful immigration was
not the issue. We drew a number of conclusions in that work:
First, that the communities targeted since 9/11 were not exclusively non-citizens; they were, and continue to be,
Arabs and Muslims in the US, both citizens and non-citizens, whom the government has not suspected of criminal
activity, let alone suspicion of terrorist involvement.71
Second, that many of these new government measures were new legal strategies that avoided constitutional pro-
tections for Arabs and Muslims that would not be tolerated in other contexts.72
Third, that secrecy was a major weapon in accomplishing the governments’ objectives: using relatively unknown
provisions in the Patriot Act, tax, banking, and other laws to allow the government to take action without notice or
opportunity for the individual to defend himself.73
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69The author thanks BUSL student Kevin Gregg for his able assistance in the research for this paper.
70David Cole, After September 11: What We Still Don’t Know, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Sept. 29, 2011, at 1.
71For example, the Iraqi voluntary interview program; the terrorist organization and material support provisions of the Patriot Act; the asset forfeiture, bank account
freezing measures; production of census records and tax information demanded from the Census Bureau and the IRS by the Senate; the systematic counting and sur-
veillance of mosques; the subpoenaing of charitable donation records—all target US citizens, not just immigrants. 
72For example, the material witness statute cases, the use of the material support provisions, the enemy combatant labels to avoid judicial process—were all de-
signed and implemented to sidestep constitutional rights.
73The government has been able to freeze the assets of the largest Muslim charitable institutions, arrest and detain prominent members of Muslim organizations, re-
quire disclosure of donors of the charities, and shut down the largest Muslim charities in the US. The IRS has been required to turn over confidential tax and financial
records of the charities, and the FBI has visited mosques all over the country demanding membership lists. The evidence the government uses to designate FTOs or
STDGs is confidential, as is the subpoenaing of charity and tax records, and cannot be challenged through court proceedings. 
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In the decade since 9/11, what has changed? Is the worst over? Has the law won? And, finally, are we safer? In an
admittedly as-yet-incomplete study of more recent policies, my tentative conclusions are that: 1) The wars abroad
have become the wars at home: there is little to differentiate foreign policies from domestic policies, a foregone
conclusion when the “war” was designated a war on terror rather than a war on any particular nation or group. 2)
Bush-era secrecy policies are viral and permanent. In the words of Dana Priest, Top Secret America is here to stay.
The uncontrolled use of security classifications, expansion of secret surveillance, use of ‘national security letters,’
and the new industry of contract surveillance has made it impossible to determine what is legitimate government
security concern and what is, for example, routine immigration process. 3) Local law enforcement has been deeply
and inextricably infused with federal and immigration law enforcement, and all three have become deeply inter-
twined with US international intelligence gathering and data mining. 4) The institutionalization of Arab-Muslim
racism has reached a new phase--entrenching Islamophobia into law enforcement. 5) Finally, it is all terrorism, and
not much about terrorism—whether the issue is border policy with Mexico, routine traffic stops, or recruiting rid-
ers on the subway to ‘see something, say something,’ terrorism has become a marketing tool, recruiting tool, and
cover for draining billions from the public coffers, with no end in sight. Meanwhile, there is little evidence that the
costs are justified, whether in preventing terrorism or are being directed towards real threats.
I will take up the last three of the above points, and only touch on some of the evidence for each of these points
before returning to my last question: are we safer?
Local law enforcement has been deeply and inextricably infused with federal and immigration law enforcement,
and all three have become deeply intertwined with US international intelligence gathering and data mining.
The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative (NSI) and Federally Funded “Anti-Terrorism” Law Enforce-
ment Training
Since 2006, the Department of Justice has been developing a program called the Nationwide Suspicious Activity
Reporting Initiative (NSI), through which local police act as intelligence gatherers on the ground, feeding reports of
suspicious activity to a network of electronic data “fusion centers” spread across the country.74 The system is
scheduled to be up and running in all seventy-two of the nation’s fusion centers by the end of 2011.75 The goal of
NSI is to make information on possible terrorist activities available to “those who need it in time to protect our
people and institutions while at the same time ensure[] that privacy, civil liberties, and other legal rights are ade-
quately protected.”76 The nationwide database will hold information on both “terrorism related specific activity”
and “those involving other criminal activity.”77 The initiative is based on the new concept of “intelligence led polic-
ing,” which emphasizes surveillance and seizures of individuals before an actual terrorist act is committed.78 The
program makes local police officers information gatherers, encouraging them to dig into the personal lives of po-
tential terrorists.
Based on the theory that greater terrorist acts are preceded by “precursor crimes,”79 police are expected to na-
tionally share information attained from even petty crimes including traffic violations.  However, because traffic en-
forcement is more prone to racial, ethnic, and religious profiling, information gathered through traffic stops and
submitted into the “terrorism” database inevitably leads to increased attention and suspicions of Middle Eastern,
Arab, South East Asian, and Muslim individuals.80 The Initiative’s new information sharing systems allow racialized
fears about terrorism to be magnified on the national level in a self-perpetuating cycle, in which ethnic fears and
heightened suspicions in one town can be transmitted throughout the country’s police offices on a national level,
leading to increased surveillance and suspicions.81
74Meg Stalcup & Joshua Craze, How We Train Our Cops to Fear Islam, WASH. MONTHLY, March/April 2011, available at http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/fea-
tures/2011/1103.stalcup-craze.html.
75Id.
76OFFICE OF THE PROGRAM MANAGER, INFORMATION SHARING ENVIRONMENT, NATIONWIDE SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTING INITIATIVE (NSI) TECHNICAL IM-
PLEMENTATION OPTIONS 1 (2010), available at http://www.ise.gov/sites/default/files/NSI_Tech_Impl_Options_Version_1_FINAL_2010-03-09.pdf. 
77Id. at 2-3. 
78THOMAS CINCOTTA, POLITICAL RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, PLATFORM FOR PREJUDICE: HOW THE NATIONWIDE SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTING INITIATIVE INVITES
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While the Initiative does not officially condone racial or ethnic profiling, Patriot Act provisions (such as allowing po-
lice to monitor and enter places of worship without identifying themselves) combined with personal prejudices and
local racial-profiling techniques lead to measures targeting Middle-Eastern groups and meritless harassment.82
The institutionalization of Arab-Muslim racism has reached a new phase—entrenching Islamophobia into law en-
forcement.
Educating Police in the Service of the ‘Anti-Terrorist’ state
Many in the Obama administration believe that “all terrorism is local,” and that local police are the front line of de-
fense.83 As a result, the administration has set aside millions of dollars to fund a nationwide initiative aimed at
helping local law enforcement agencies understand and stop terrorism.84 Through use of these funds, local law en-
forcement agencies have hired a motley crew of instructors, some with experience in federal anti-terrorism, others
simply of Middle-Eastern descent with anti-Muslim biases.85 Thom Cincotta’s 80-page study, “Manufacturing the
Muslim Menace: Private Firms, Public Servants, and the Threat to Rights and Security” describes the growth of the
private industry of ‘Islamic terrorism’ experts being hired to teach law enforcement personnel across the country.
These “expert’s” programs give police a three-day crash course in the “tenets of Islam” and Islam’s links to terror-
ism.86 Some of the “experts” are parts of large security firms while others are independent contractors.87 In one
such training, the “expert,” a Jordanian-American named Sam Kharoba, taught 60 South Florida police officers how
to spot a terrorist: 
“[Wh]en you have a Muslim that wears a headband, regardless of color or insignia, basically what that is telling you
is ‘I am willing to be a martyr.”  “From the perspective of operational security, there are two things I am always
looking out for: a shaved body and moving lips...”88
After a police officer in the crowd asked Kharoba what to do, he responded that the only Muslim immigrants not
immediately under suspicion are ones who “Americanize” their names, and that
“[t]he best way to handle these people is what I call legal harassment.”  “Start to identify who is coming into your
area.”  “Go to the DMV and see who has applied for a driving license.  Look at the owners of convenience stores.
Corner stores are one of the principal ways Hezbollah launders money in the United States.”  “You only need one
precedent.”  “Health inspectors, alcohol trade officers, these guys can turn a convenience store upside down with-
out a warrant.”89
After leaving one of Kharoba’s trainings, one police officer was quoted as saying: “yeah, the gangs are a threat . . .
but they don’t have 1.5 billion members.”90
Many “expert” instructors surveyed share a common world-view: “a conflict against Islam that involves everyone,
without distinction between combatant and noncombatant, law enforcement and military.”91 There are almost no
guidelines or oversight for such instructors, yet they have trained tens of thousands of law enforcement officers.92
Reports of discriminatory policies tied to these trainings have led to inquiries by Senators Joe Lieberman and Susan
Collins, putting the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) on the defensive.93 Even federal agencies seem to
have lowered their content standards. The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) provides training to
82Id. at 20, 40-41 (listing a variety of incidences of meritless ethnic police targeting).
83Id. at 36.
84Dina Temple-Raston, Terrorism Training Cast Pall Over Muslim Employee, NPR, July 18, 2011, available at http://www.npr.org/2011/07/18/137712352/terrorism-
training-casts-pall-over-muslim-employee. 
85Id.
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more than eighty federal law enforcement agencies;94 Kharoba was courted and allowed to teach his course at
FLETC for over a year until students complained about the Islamophobic content.95 He has since been barred from
teaching. But he is one of dozens of such pseudo-Islamic-experts educating law enforcement around the country.96
Nationality-Based Profiling and Air Travel
Following the 2009 Christmas Day airplane-bombing attempt, the Obama administration announced that the TSA
would begin “country based” profiling.97 Since 2010, travelers from 14 countries have automatically received
extra airport scrutiny, including pat-downs and full body scans.98 Citizens arriving from or with passports from
“state sponsors of terrorism” (Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria) and “countries of interest” (Afghanistan, Algeria,
Lebanon, Libya, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Yemen) are subject to the added scrutiny.99 The TSA
has claimed to avoid “racial profiling,” and a Homeland Security officer defended the program, saying it used an
“abundance of caution.”100 Similar systems were put into effect in the 1990s and immediately post-9/11, but did
not result in a single documented terrorist apprehension.101 Some argue that instead of catching terrorists, the
programs “make entry into the United States more burdensome and unwelcoming, creating a clear sense among
Muslims worldwide that they were being discriminated against.”102
The Effects of New Police Counter-Terrorism Policies on Arabs and Muslims 
Use of Informants and Creative Prosecutions
The government has drastically increased the use of informants to arrest, detain and charge persons within the
Arab and Muslim communities on terrorism-related grounds. The increasing number of cases in which convictions
are obtained on terrorist-related grounds based on the use of informants in mosques and other community
spaces, is raising concerns about whether government operatives are facilitating terrorist intent or activities that
were previously nonexistent.103 The technique is controversial because it “creates” terrorist intent and allows ar-
rest of a suspect after an overt act that may not have led to a criminal act, or may not have led to any act at all
without the instigation of the informant.  In many instances, government operatives are fellow Middle Eastern or
Muslim immigrants.  Some Muslim community activists fear that law enforcement officials coerce immigrants into
becoming informants and operatives, especially immigrants with legal problems or those applying for green
cards.104 Others fear that informants target and potentially entice impressionable youths into fictitious terrorist
plots.105 Regardless, it is clear that Middle Eastern and Muslim individuals, whether petty criminal or regular civil-
ian, have been targeted for use as government operatives.  There have been reports of individuals forced to leave
the country after refusing to act as informants,106 and many prospective asylum seekers fear the threat of deporta-
tion if they do not cooperate. 
The material support statutes are an attempt to create a specific inchoate crime of ‘supporting terrorism.’ The fun-
damental problem is that there is no clear line between criminal support for terrorism and the legitimate exercise
of protected First Amendment speech and association rights. The current approach is to categorize almost every-
thing as material support, but to criminalize it when given only to listed recipients. Currently, 31 of the 46 desig-
nated Foreign Terrorist Organizations are Arab or Muslim, and of the four countries designated as State Sponsors
of Terrorism, 3 are Arab or Muslim majority countries—Cuba is the single non-Arab/Muslim state on the list. 
94Id.
95Id.
96See Cincotta, supra note 78.
97Dr James J Zogby (President Arab American Institute), Profiling is back.!, GULF DAILY NEWS, Jan. 14, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 748244.
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The difficulty of prosecuting material support terrorism cases is illustrated by David Cole’s characterization: “Now
the administration is defending on appeal a conviction… of members of the board of the Holy Land Foundation, the
nation’s largest Muslim charity, who were sentenced to as much as sixty-five years in prison for providing humani-
tarian aid to hungry and indigent families in the West Bank—even though, according to the government’s own evi-
dence, not a penny went to any group designated as terrorist, and not a penny was used for anything but
humanitarian purposes.”107 
Most interesting, all of the material support prosecutions have been brought through the use of informants—usu-
ally through FBI surveillance of mosques and intimidation of an individual identified as vulnerable for some reason
through that surveillance. Wadie Said, whose 2010 article is thus far the most detailed review of the use of inform-
ants and material support, terrorism-related prosecutions, concludes: “The use of informants in federal terrorist
prosecutions has been an overall failure, despite its successes in procuring convictions in the courtroom. Individuals
have been prosecuted where they did not represent a threat and the informant’s behavior could very well have
prompted, as opposed to discovered, the criminal activity. When placed in the context of the racialization of Arabs
and Muslims as terrorists, the results are understandable but not justifiable.”108
The ACLU has been tracking the increased surveillance of mosques around the country by the FBI, and FBI planting or
generating informants from that surveillance. “[T]he FBI is using Attorney General Ashcroft’s loosened profiling stan-
dards, together with broader authority to use paid informants, to conduct surveillance of American Muslims in case
they might engage in wrongdoing. For more than 14 months between 2006 and 2007, for example, FBI agents planted
an informant in mainstream mosques in Orange County, California. The informant posed as a convert to Islam and col-
lected names, telephone numbers, e-mails and other information on hundreds of American Muslims who were not
suspected of wrongdoing. Predictably, this dragnet surveillance did not result in a single terrorism conviction.”109 
Communication Management Units (CMUs)
Communication Management Units (CMUs) are maximum-security prison facilities designed to “house inmates
who, due to their current offense of conviction, offense conduct, or other verified information, require increased
monitoring of communication.”110 Many believe these facilities necessary to combat increasing homegrown terror-
ism.111 There are currently two CMUs: one in the former death row unit at Terre Haute, Indiana (established Dec.
11, 2006), and one in Marion, Illinois (established March 20, 2008).112 The facilities were created under the George
W. Bush administration, and originated as independent initiatives of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP).113 CMU
inmates are under 24-hour surveillance, and allotted two fifteen minutes phone calls every week (in contrast to the
300 monthly phone hours allotted to many super-max inmates).114 These inmates receive eight visiting hours each
month;115 only family members can visit, and visits must be done through Plexiglas without physical contact, and in
English (unless an interpreter is present).116 The units have been described as “experiments in social isolation.”117
As of June 2011, the two CMU’s housed 82 inmates.118 Between 66%-72% of these inmates were Muslim or of
Middle Eastern descent, even though they make up only 6% of the total prison population.119 Several of the defen-
dants in the Holy Land Fund prosecution have been placed in CMUs.  The units house inmates (1) with current of-
fense(s) of conviction, conduct, association, communication, or involvement, related to international or domestic
terrorisms; (2) with current offense(s) of conviction, offense conduct, or activity while incarcerated, which indicates
a propensity to encourage, coordinate, facilitate, or otherwise act in furtherance of, illegal activity through commu-
nication with persons in the community; (3) who have attempted, or indicate a propensity, to contact victims of the
107Cole, supra note 70, at 8.
108Wadie E. Said, The Terrorist Informant, 85 Wash. L. Rev. 687, 738 (2010).
109American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), A Call to Courage: Reclaiming our Liberties Ten Years After 9/11 23 (2011), available at http://www.aclu.org/national-secu-
rity/report-call-courage-reclaiming-our-liberties-ten-years-after-911.
110Aref v. Holder, No. 10-0539, 2011 WL 1195813, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2011).
111Christopher S. Stewart, Little Gitmo,’NEW YORK MAGAZINE, July 10, 2011, at 1, available at http://nymag.com/news/features/yassin-aref-2011-7/.
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inmate's current offense(s) of conviction; or (4) who have committed prohibited activity related to misuse/abuse of
approved communication methods while incarcerated.120 BOP regulations clearly indicate that the CMUs are de-
signed to totally control prisoner communication, especially amongst prisoners with suspected terrorist links.121
The federal bureau of prisons recognizes that CMUs differ from other units, noting, “inmates in this unit represent
multiple ethnic backgrounds which include an international flavor.”122 Shortly after President Obama took office,
“balancers” (as called by CMU guards) were reportedly blended into the population in order to address the criti-
cism that the CMUs housed only Muslims.123 These “balancers” included environmental activists, sexual preda-
tors, and bank robbers: anyone who prison officials claimed “recruit and radicalize.”124 Although the CMUs remain
disproportionately Muslim, a D.C. District Court recently ruled that Muslim inmates could not bring a 14th Amend-
ment discrimination claim because they could not prove that the BOP acted with discriminatory intent.125 The
court also ruled that CMU confinement did not constitute 8th Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment.126 The
CMU’s, housing almost exclusively Muslim inmates, and many convicted on inchoate crimes such as ‘material sup-
port to terrorism,’ appear to single out the Muslim population for special punishment for the very fact of being
Muslim, because they practice, and hence ‘communicate’ their faith.
It is all terrorism, and not much about terrorism
Whether the issue is border policy with Mexico, routine traffic stops, or recruiting riders on the subway to ‘see
something, say something,’ terrorism has become a marketing tool, recruiting tool, and cover for draining billions
from the public coffers, with no end in sight. The example of the US-Mexico border ‘fence’ will suffice to illustrate
the point. 
In his just-published book The Fence, Robert Lee Maril gives an expose of the corruption of so-called border ‘secu-
rity’ policies.127 He describes the cronyism of Congress and federal agencies with private contractors, using anti-
terrorism as the justification, to award several billion dollars in secret no-bid contracts, which, he contends, have
neither slowed undocumented immigration nor had anything to do with countering terrorism.  
The Clinton administration first authorized the construction of sophisticated border fencing that was supposed to
combine computers, radar, satellite links and cameras to provide an all-encompassing high-tech barrier between
the US and Mexico. The ‘virtual’ and concrete fence was to cover about 650 miles of the 2,000-mile border. First
put in place in 1998 as ISIS (the Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System), constructed by L-3 Communications,
the fence cost $250 million and then was found not to function properly. Several incarnations later, post-9/11 it
then morphed into SBInet, or Security Border Initiative network. In 2005 Boeing received a contract to design and
build a virtual fence across the entire border. According to Maril, “they built only about ten sensor towers and fif-
teen communications towers, but according to the Government Accountability Office reports none of them ever
worked. In my opinion they wasted more than $1 billion of taxpayer money.”128 Despite the lack of accountability
for the billions lost on the prior virtual and actual fencing, the government has put out bids worth $750 million for
another high-tech virtual fence just on the Arizona border named the Alternative Southwest Border Technology
Plan. Again, the bids are secret, so the public does not have access to the specifics; presumably the same compa-
nies that built the prior versions will bid again for another round of massive profits. Justification for the fence has
been threefold: 1) decrease illegal migration; 2) increase drug interception; and 3) stop alleged terrorists. As to
whether the goals have been met, Maril responds that illegal migration is down, but it’s unclear whether that is re-
lated to the border fencing or to the recession, and, at the same time, more people are losing their lives trying to
cross. On the second point, although more drugs have been intercepted in the last few years, more hard drugs are
coming in to the US than ever before.129 And on the third point, Maril states: 
120Communication Management Units, 75 Fed. Reg. 17324-01 (Proposed April 6, 2010) (to be codified as 28 C.F.R. pt. 540), at 17327.
121See id. at 17326 (stating that “past behaviors of terrorist inmates provide sufficient grounds to suggest a substantial risk that they may inspire or incite terrorist-re-
lated activity, especially if communicated to groups willing to engage in or to provide equipment or logistics to facilitate terrorist-related activity. The potential ramifi-
cations of this activity outweigh the inmate's interest in unlimited communication with persons in the community.”).
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128Justin Elliott, Obama Mimics Bush on the Border Fence, SALON (May 14, 2011), http://www.salon.com/news/politics/war_room/2011/05/14/obama_mexico_bor-
der_wall (interview with Robert Lee Maril).
129Maril, supra note 127. 
 
 The 9/11 Effect
- 45 -
I can find no known public record of any terrorist ever being stopped since 2005-06 when construction of the 
wall began. That was one of the three major reasons that the wall was built. What my law enforcement informants
tell me is that a terrorist group would be foolish to risk bringing someone in from Mexico when they can come 
in from so many other places with false documents.130
What are all these measures costing us? “According to Admiral (Ret.) Dennis Blair, who served as director of na-
tional intelligence under both Bush and Obama, the United States today spends about $80 billion a year, not includ-
ing expenditures in Iraq and Afghanistan (which of course dwarf that sum). Generous estimates of the strength of
al-Qaeda and its affiliates, Blair reports, put them at between three thousand and five thousand men. That means
we are spending between $16 million and $27 million per year on each potential terrorist…”131 
Does all this make us safer? Official FBI records show that only 6% of terrorist attacks on US soil from 1980-2005
were carried out by Islamic extremists. The remaining 94% were from other groups (42% from Latinos, 24% from
extreme left wing groups, 7% from extremist Jews, 5% from communists, and 16% from all other groups).132 Data
gathered by Europol in its annual reports shows a similar low rate of ‘Muslim’ terrorism. The ‘EU Terrorism Situa-
tion and Trend Report,’ shows 99.6% of terrorist attacks in Europe were by non-Muslim groups; 84.8% were from
separatist groups unrelated to Islam; leftist groups were responsible for 16 times as many terrorist acts as radical Is-
lamic groups. From 2007-2009, 0.4% of terrorist attacks in Europe could be attributed to extremist Muslims.133
The Response to Non-Muslim Terrorism?
As the evidence itself shows, “terrorism is not a ‘Muslim’ phenomenon.”134 A 2009 DHS report written by Daryl
Johnson (then senior domestic terrorism analyst with the DHS) found right-wing extremism rapidly on the rise. The
report claims right-wing terrorism is being fueled by such factors as the recession, real-estate slump, job outsourc-
ing, illegal immigration, increased gun control laws, and the return of military veterans.135 The report states that
the “DHS/I&A will be working with its state and local partners over the next several months to ascertain with
greater regional specificity the rise in rightwing extremist activity in the United States, with a particular emphasis
on the political, economic, and social factors that drive rightwing extremist radicalization.”136
Shortly after it was issued internally, the report was leaked and immediately attacked by right-wing conservative
groups and politicians, leading DHS to claim the report was unauthorized.137 Now, according to the Washington
Post, the DHS "has stepped back . . . from conducting its own intelligence and analysis of home-grown extremism . .
. even though law enforcement and civil rights experts have warned of rising extremist threats.”138 Additionally,
the Post reported that "the department has cut the number of personnel studying domestic terrorism unrelated to
Islam...”139 Despite the report, the DHS has continued to focus its resources on investigating the threat of Mus-
lim/Middle-Eastern terrorism.140
So if Muslims in the US account for approximately 6% of terrorist acts, less than extremist Jews and far less than
Latinos, why can’t we find reports of counting and surveillance of synagogues, the Latino churches, or--as would be
suggested from the DHS’ own report--the fundamentalist churches of right wing extremists? Why is there no evi-
dence of law enforcement being trained on the “right-wing extremist threat,” or “Jewish terrorism” or “Latino ter-
rorism?” Why does the population of the CMUs not more closely approximate the 42% Latino, 24% left wingers, 7%
Jews, 5% communists, and 16% all other groups that the data suggests represent the full panoply of terrorist
threats? It might be that, unlike Muslims, targeting of other religious groups would not be tolerated, and Muslim
terrorism is the only package that gives the behemoth security apparatus a blank check. 
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Post 9/11 A Decade Later: Keeping Immigrants Out
On May 1, 2011, major television stations interrupted the evening with the announcement that Osama Bin Laden
was dead.  President Obama went live at 11:00 p.m. pacific standard time.  As the details trickled in, I felt an imme-
diate rush of emotions: grief, sadness, and anguish.  Memories came rushing back to me.  I remembered where I
was when the World Trade Center came down that morning.  I remembered the immediate days after 9/11 when I
was triaging emails and phone calls at the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund (“AALDEF”) concern-
ing hate incidents targeting Sikhs in New York City and around the country.  I remembered the hundreds of South
Asian, Arab and Muslim men I represented in immigration detention months and years after September 11th.
While the memories seemed so long ago, on the night of May 1st, the memories came back like it had all happened
yesterday. 
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the Bush Administration implemented policies such as secret detention, spe-
cial registration and the absconder initiative, specifically, targeting South Asian, Arab and Muslim communities.  On
September 21, 2001, Chief Immigration Judge Michael Creppy issued a memorandum ordering all courts to be
closed and to adhere to secret procedures when an immigrant detainee is labeled as “special interest.”141 In Au-
gust 2002, the call-in registration portion of the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (“NSEERS”) man-
dated that certain men (and boys over 16) from twenty-five predominantly Muslim countries and North Korea were
required to report to local immigration offices between November 2002 and April 2003.142 At the conclusion of the
special registration program, 82,581 individuals nationwide had been questioned, fingerprinted and interrogated
under oath.143 These blanket policies were intended to racially profile members of these communities, indefinitely
detain them pending terrorism investigations based solely on race and religion and then deport them back to their
home countries without ever charging them with terrorism.   There is no question as to the racial and religious
overtones of these policies.  At AALDEF, in New York City, I represented many of these individuals from 2001 to
2005.  These individuals were predominantly male, 16-45 years of age, and recent immigrants from South Asian,
Arab and Muslim countries.  
Throughout this decade, many of these post 9/11 policies have reached beyond the racial scope of the South Asian,
Arab and Muslim diaspora.  The threat of another 9/11 has become a reason to expand these policies to exclude all
immigrants, regardless of their race and religion.  It was no longer just about race and religion, but about national
origin.  Many of these policies are now aimed at preventing noncitizens from obtaining immigration status, includ-
ing political asylum and lawful permanent residency, by alleging that these individuals engaged in “material support
to terrorism.”  These same allegations were used to prevent individuals from immigrating to the United States to
join their families or to work or attend conferences in the U.S.  Other remnants of post 9/11, called the FBI “Name
141Memorandum from the Chief Immigration Judge Michael Creppy to all Immigration Judges and Court administrators (Sept. 21, 2001)(on file with the Executive Of-
fice for Immigration Review); see also INTERPRETER RELEASES, Dec. 3, 2001, at 1816, 1819.
142Registration of Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens from Designated Countries, 67 Fed. Reg. 66765, 77641 (2002); 68 id. 2363-64 (2003); Permission for Certain Nonim-
migrant Aliens from Designated Countries to Register in a Timely Fashion, id. at 2366; Registration of Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens from Designated Countries, 68 id.
at 8046.
143Rachel L. Swarns, Thousands of Arabs and Muslims Could Be Deported, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2003 at A1.  
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Check,” delayed applications for citizenship because of a “hit” using some variation of their names.   Communities
impacted by these policies expanded to include Asians, Latinos, Eastern Europeans, Russians, and Africans.  While
the earlier policies worked towards ferreting out individuals based on their race and religion, later policies aimed at
excluding individuals and keeping them out of the country because they were not American citizens.
After four years of post 9/11 cases, I was burnt out and exhausted.  I moved to San Francisco, California hoping to
take a break from these cases to focus on broader immigrants’ rights issues.  To my surprise, I found that it was im-
possible to avoid these issues because the post 9/11 policies had become deeply entrenched in the immigration
system. Since 2006, I have been working at the Asian Law Caucus, the first civil rights organization serving the Asian
Pacific American community.  At the Caucus, my work ranges from representing immigrants facing deportation
while in ICE custody to affirmative litigation in the SB1070 cases in the South, ie., Georgia and Alabama.
On July 2, 2007, the Asian Law Caucus, along with the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) of Northern Califor-
nia and Council for American Islamic Relations, brought a lawsuit in the Northern District of California challenging
the FBI “Name Check” process as applied to the naturalization process.144 Lawful permanent residents eligible to
become a citizen must file an N-400 application.  U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) runs each of these
applications against a number of databases, including the FBI “name check.”  In response to 9/11, the FBI “name
check” was expanded to include not only the FBI’s “main files” but also “references.”  Applicants’ names register a
“hit” if they were merely a witness or victim of a crime, if they had assisted with the FBI with an investigation, or if
they had undergone an employment-related security clearance in the past.  The name checks also turn up a high
number of false positives because they use alternate permutations of applicants’ names.  If there is a “hit,” CIS will
not continue to process a naturalization application even when the law required that an adjudication be made
within 120 days of an examination.145 By May 2008, the number of pending citizenship cases had ballooned up to
329,000 cases, with 64% of these cases stalled for more than 90 days.146
In Ahmadi v. Chertoff, our class plaintiffs came from countries including China (including Hong Kong), India, Pak-
istan, Russia, Canada, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, and Afghanistan.  At the Asian Law Caucus, we received
over 300 intakes involving naturalization delays due to the FBI name check, with a disproportionate impact on the
Chinese, Russian and Muslim communities.  The expansion of the FBI “name check” after 9/11 was intended to ex-
clude as many noncitizens from obtaining the rights and benefits of citizenship which includes the right to vote, the
right to file visa petitions for immediate family members, and the right to federal benefits, as possible.  Ahmadi v.
Chertoff settled in 2008 as did most of the class action lawsuits filed in response to the FBI “name check.”
On January 25, 2002, the Department of Justice issued the Absconder Initiative Memorandum which outlined the
goal of identifying, apprehending and deporting individuals with final orders of removal.147 Individuals arrested
under the Absconder Initiative in the months following 9/11 were predominantly Muslims.148 By 2008, 33,997
noncitizens were detained as part of the Fugitive Operations Apprehensions which morphed from the Alien Ab-
sconder Initiative initially targeting terrorists.  Ten years ago, I only represented Muslims who were arrested under
the fugitive operations initiative.  Today, in California, there isn’t a week that passes where I do not receive a phone
call involving a fugitive operations case; however the individuals are no longer Muslim, but Asian and/or Latino.
The most notable fugitive operations case I recently handled involved the arrest of Steve Li, a Peruvian Chinese
DREAM Act student whose case garnered national attention.  He was 12-years old when he came to the United
States.  He was 15-years old when he was ordered removed by the Board of Immigration Appeals.  He was 20-years
old and studying at City College of San Francisco when ICE raided his home and arrested him.  He was involuntarily
transferred to the Florence Detention Center in Arizona and detained for approximately three months before Cali-
fornia Senator Dianne Feinstein intervened with a private immigration bill.  Illinois Senator Dick Durbin cited Steve’s
144Ahmadi v. Chertoff, No. C 07-03455-WHA, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108555 (N.D CA. 2008).
1458 U.S.C. § 1447(b).
146N.C. Aizenman & Spencer S. Hsu, FBI Name Check Cited in Naturalization Delays Official Calls Backlog ‘Unacceptable’, WASH. POST, June 17, 2007, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/16/AR2007061601360.html. 
147Memorandum from the Deputy Attorney General to the INA, FBI, U.S. Marshals and U.S. Attorneys Office (Jan. 25, 2002)(on file with the Office of the Attorney
General).  




case when he reintroduced the DREAM Act on May 11, 2011.  Steve is not South Asian, Arab or Muslim, nor is he a
terrorist or has never engaged in terrorist activities.  
Today’s post 9/11 policies aim at preventing Muslims from entering the country even if they were properly peti-
tioned by family members and then granted an immigrant visa.  In February 2010, the Asian Law Caucus filed a
complaint with the Northern District of California on behalf of Fauzia Din, a U.S. Citizen and Afghani national, who
petitioned on behalf of her husband, an Afghani citizen.  Fauzia’s husband had been employed as a government
clerk in the Afghan Ministry of Education since 2003. His job duties involved processing paperwork and other low-
level administrative duties.  From 1992 to 2003, he worked as a payroll clerk in the Afghan Ministry of Social Wel-
fare, where he processed payroll for school teachers and performed other low-level administrative duties.  From
1996 to 2001, during the Taliban occupation of Afghanistan, he continued to work in the Ministry of Social Welfare
in the same capacity as before, and after, the Taliban occupation.  During the Taliban occupation of Afghanistan,
he never implemented any policy changes on the Taliban’s behalf.  
In 2006, Fauzia filed an I-130 Petition for Alien Relative for her husband and it was approved on 2008.  On July 13,
2009, the American Embassy denied the visa petition under INA § 212(a)(3)(B), a provision of the Act applicable to
“terrorist activities.”  However, the Government never explained what the terrorist activities involved.  Under con-
sular process rules, a consulate decision to issue or withhold a visa is not subject to either administrative or judicial
review unless the denial of the visa implicates the constitutional rights of American citizens.149 Our lawsuit argued
that the consular officer’s denial of her immigrant visa petition on behalf of her husband violated her constitutional
right to due process.  The case is currently before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.150 Fauzia has been separated
from her husband for the past five years.  
Similarly, in 2009, the Asian Law Caucus represented the family member of Umar Hayat.  Hayat is best known for
his association with the Lodi Terrorism Case.  Umar Hayat, an ice cream truck driver, and his son, Hamid Hayat
were arrested in 2006 when an informant provided bad intelligence claiming that Osama Bin Laden’s deputy,
Ayman Al Zawahiri, had visited Lodi, California.  Later, this intelligence turned out to be false.  The Government
dropped charges against Umar Hayat, but his son was sentenced to 24 years in prison for attending a training camp
in Pakistan.  In 2009, Mr. Hayat’s relative was granted an immigrant visa based on his U.S. Citizen wife’s visa peti-
tion. He interviewed at the American Embassy in Islamabad and consular processed with a visa issued on Septem-
ber 2009.  Mid-air through his travels and before he arrived at the San Francisco International Airport (“SFO”), the
Government revoked his visa without explanation and instead, paroled him into the United States.  He was de-
tained at SFO for approximately five hours. He was allowed to enter the U.S. through the parole status, but was
not considered to have been admitted for the purposes of immigration laws.  About three months later, he was
given an appointment to return to Borders and Customs expecting that he would be issued a Notice to Appear and
be allowed to appear before an Immigration Judge.   Instead, he was interrogated for several hours, arrested, de-
tained and expeditiously removed after hours of interrogation.  As his counsel, I was not allowed to represent my
client and was kicked out of the interview when I asked to speak with my client privately when he was asked
whether he feared returning to Pakistan.  A frail, old, diabetic man who requires insulin shots was hauled off to a
local county jail before he was put on a plane back to Pakistan.  It was clear that Mr. Hayat’s relative was paroled
into the U.S. only for the purposes of gathering intelligence.  As soon as they obtained information, they deported
him from the United States.
On the night of May 1st, we all watched images broadcast from outside the White House and near Ground Zero in
New York City.  We watched hordes of young people, mostly college students, celebrating in jubilation and ex-
treme jingoism.  These are the children of 9/11 --- young people who were only 8-10 years old and are now in their
late teens and early 20’s.  They grew up with catch phrases like “war on terrorism” and “weapons of mass destruc-
tion.”   The celebrations in front of the White House were seen and heard around the world.  These disturbing im-
ages reflect on all Americans and the fact that we have not progressed in the past decade.  In spite of the great
work of lawyers and advocates immediately after 9/11, we have failed to learn and reflect from lessons of the past,
times like Japanese American internment when we forfeited people’s rights in search of a false sense of security.
On September 11th of this year, we will mark the ten-year anniversary of the day that changed all of our lives, and
149Bustamente v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 1059, 1061 (9th Cir. 2008).
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particularly, the lives of immigrants, South Asians, Arabs and Muslims.  A new paradigm was created after 9/11
where the balance tipped in favor of creating greater power in government over the rights of the people.  It per-
mits us to interpret the Constitution in a way that justifies the detention of individuals in Guantanamo for nearly a
decade without charging them.  It refuses these men access to civilian courts so that they can be properly tried.
The new norm justifies acts of water boarding and other forms of torture, because we have convinced ourselves
that the information we retrieved led to Bin Laden.  It is a paradigm that fails to question government conduct that
includes illegal wiretapping and then permits the government to hide behind the doctrine of “states secrets.”
When we look at the images of the young people in front of the White House that night, sitting on trees, and cele-
brating like it was the Super Bowl, I am anxious at how much we are willing to give up and accept as the norm. If
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Immigration, Race, and September 11th:  Perspectives on Policy Advocacy
On the morning of September 11, 2001, I woke up bleary-eyed as I made my way to breakfast at my parents’ home
in California. As the television was on in our kitchen during the normal hustle of our morning routines, I caught a
glimpse of two burning towers marring the bright skyline of New York City. Thinking that it was just an action film
on the screen, at first, I did not give these images much more than a passing thought.  Only after watching for a
few more minutes did I realize that this was real and the shock sank in – terror had struck American soil and the
sheer magnitude of loss and destruction was overwhelming. 
Upon witnessing the attacks on television and being inescapably gripped by news coverage, there was a numbness
that I felt, along with so many other Americans grappling with the immense and profound tragedy. In a matter of
mere days, however, a sense of fear and insecurity set in as reports of backlash and discrimination came pouring
in. At the time, I was working for Amnesty International’s National Refugee Office in San Francisco, where I was
scouring newspapers to compile lists upon lists of hate crimes being committed against Arabs, Muslims, Sikhs, and
South Asians across the country. Reading about one incident of a South Asian man beaten to the point where his
mouth needed to be wired shut at a restaurant in my hometown and seeing effigies of non-descript brown bodies
with turbans and robes strung up at house on my block, I knew that, if I was not before, I was certainly now part of
the “other” America. Albeit naively, I had still thought that such hatred was an anomaly and that pernicious stereo-
types equating Arabs, Muslims, Sikhs, and South Asians as terrorists would not seep into the government charged
with protecting us. Yet, what soon developed were immigration and national security policies that were steeped in
the targeting of these very communities on the basis of race.
September 11th and the policies that took hold in its aftermath were a redux of a history of state-sanctioned dis-
crimination that has been perpetrated against other communities of color – from the internment of Japanese
Americans during World War II to the denial of rights from African Americans to migration restrictions affecting
Latino immigrants. Indeed, an era emerged where immigrants of all backgrounds have been turned away or fer-
reted out by the government as never before. But while the impetus and the impact of post-September 11th immi-
gration and national security policies were and continue to be driven by the race, the advocacy strategies to
counter such programs at the local and national levels have had additional layers. Specifically, this has required: 1)
presenting how religion and national origin have now become stand-ins for race; 2) revealing how these policies
are ineffective at keeping our country secure, with safety being a concern that transcends race; and 3) appealing to
the ideals of compassion, fairness, and equality to which Americans across races aspire. With a spotlight on one
program that has especially impacted South Asian, Arab, and Muslim populations, this essays aims to explore how
these tactics have influenced advocacy strategies for immigrant rights.
“Race Plus” – Religion and National Origin as Race Proxies and Advocacy Strategies
In addition to race, national origin and religion have become its proxy in immigration enforcement as applied to
South Asians, Arabs, and Muslims over the past decade. One can draw from a litany of examples to see how mem-
bers of these communities were placed within the crosshairs of immigration authorities, based on the misguided
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notion that their faith or their country of origin made them threats and ripe for removal. Soon after the attacks, the
government conducted “voluntary” interviews of over 3,000 nonimmigrant men from countries in which Al Qaeda
was suspected to have links or activities. Despite the voluntary nature of the interviews and their supposed infor-
mation-gathering motive, some of the men questioned were arrested for violating immigration laws, such as over-
staying past the expiration dates of their visas or working without authorization.151 In January 2002, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the then-Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)152 began implementing the
Alien Absconder Apprehension Initiative to locate over 300,000 individuals with court orders of deportation already
against them; the program was “aimed at aggressively tracking, apprehending, and removing aliens who [had] vio-
lated U.S. immigration law, been ordered deported, then fled before the order could be carried out.”153 The Federal
Bureau of Investigation and immigration authorities conducted nationwide sweeps to detain individuals who might
have links to terrorist activities. The Office of Inspector General at DOJ reported 762 individuals were detained.154
Detainees could be held without being charged, and, in cases where it was revealed that detainees had broken im-
migration laws, they were held for prolonged periods of time for even minor visa violations that would never have
previously resulted in jail time.155 The government also held over 600 secret immigration hearings where the pub-
lic, the media, and even family and friends were excluded, effectively foreclosing any chance to hold the govern-
ment accountable by scrutinizing its actions.156
Arguably, the most telling and explicit example of how the government’s immigration enforcement priorities have
been driven by factors such as race, religion, and national origin was the National Security Entry-Exit Registration
System (NSEERS). Initiated by DOJ in 2002 and subsequently administered by the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity (DHS), NSEERS’ purported intent was to track immigrants in the United States in order to prevent terrorism.
One aspect of the program required certain male nationals of 25 predominantly Muslim-majority countries to be
fingerprinted, photographed, and questioned by immigration authorities. Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians across
the country had no choice but to comply. As a result of the program, more than 83,000 men registered, over
13,000 were placed in removal proceedings, and nearly 3,000 were detained.157 But DHS has yet to show that any-
one was brought up on terrorism-related charges through the program. In fact, enforcement of this magnitude
ended up ensnaring many with minor immigration violations who posed no demonstrable threat to this country. 
With NSEERS as an example, there is no doubt that the policy’s virtually exclusive focus on nationals of Muslim-ma-
jority countries was not only racial but also religious and national origin profiling. An individual’s skin color, faith,
and country of citizenship essentially determined the likelihood of whether they would be required to participate in
the program or not. But the existing anti-profiling measures have, not surprisingly and likely intentionally, failed to
keep up with morphing nature of profiling and immigration enforcement in the post-September 11th world. In
2003, DOJ issued its Guidance Regarding the Use of Race by Law Enforcement (“DOJ Guidance”).158 While, on
paper, it does indeed prohibit racial profiling, it is woefully incomplete. Particularly as it relates to post-September
11th immigration enforcement, it allows for profiling based on religion and national origin; it also includes loop-
holes that permit profiling to occur at borders or in the name of national security. (Even if the guidance were more
comprehensive, it lacks any meaningful enforcement mechanism and does not consistently apply to state and local
law enforcement agencies.) As a result, national security and border rationales have been exceptions that have ef-
fectively swallowed the rule as it relates to immigration and counterterrorism policies; and profiling that uses reli-
gion or national origin as a proxy for race can still occur as a matter of both law and practice.
151U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-459, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT’S PROJECT TO INTERVIEW ALIENS AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 (2003).
152On March 1, 2003, the function of providing immigration-related services and benefits of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) - formerly part of the
Department of Justice – was transferred to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in the Department of Homeland Security.
153Hearing on Department of Homeland Security Transition: Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement Before the House Subcomm. on Immigration, Border
Security, and Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary , 108th Cong.(2003) (statement of Asa Hutchinson).
154U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION
CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS (June 2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/0306/full.pdf.
155HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PRESUMPTION OF GUILT:  HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES OF POST-SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES 50 (2002), available at http://www.hrw.org/re-
ports/2002/us911/.
156Kate Martin, Secret Arrests and Preventive Detention, in LOST LIBERTIES: ASHCROFT AND THE ASSAULT ON PERSONAL FREEDOM 79 (Cynthia Brown, ed., 2003).
157Nurith C. Aizenmann & Edward Walsh, Immigrants Fear Deportation After Registration; Number of Mideast, Muslim Men Expelled Rises Sharply, WASH. POST, July
28, 2003, at A01.
158U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, GUIDANCE ON REGARDING THE USE OF RACE BY FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (2003), available at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/guidance_on_race.pdf.
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159NATIONAL IMMIGRATION FORUM, TERRORISM AND THE GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE: BROAD INITIATIVES DO NOT MAKE US SAFER (2003), available at
http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/GovernmentResponsetoTerrorism.pdf.
160For more information on US-VISIT, see http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/usv.shtm.
16169 Fed. Reg. 468 (2008).
162Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, NSEERS 30-day and Annual Interview Requirements to be Suspended (Dec. 1, 2003), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0306.shtm.
163Rachel L. Swarns, Program’s Value in Dispute as a Tool to Fight Terrorism, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 2004, at A26, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=950CE0DB1330F932A15751C1A9629C8B63.
164Id.
165Civil Liberties Restoration Act, S.B. 2528/ H.R. 4591, 108th Cong. (2004); reintroduced in the House as H.R. 1502, 109th Cong. (2005).
166Civil Liberties Restoration Act, H.R. 1502, 109th Cong. § 301 (2005). It specifically closed cases of those placed in removal proceedings solely for failure to comply
with NSEERS requirements or if they complied with NSEERS and either had a pending application for an immigration benefit or were eligible to apply for such a ben-
efit.
After September 11th, the prevalence of religious and national origin profiling in the immigration context, along
with the inadequate protections on the books, spurred South Asian, Arab, and Muslim communities to partner with
other communities of color. Although work remains to be done in order to truly solidify these relationships, these
communities have partnered with African American communities historically plagued by profiling in the criminal
context and Latino communities long affected by profiling in the immigration context. Presenting a coalition force
at the local and national levels, these communities have called for reforming the DOJ Guidance on racial profiling as
well as passage of federal anti-profiling legislation, such as the End Racial Profiling Act.
We are All American: An Appeal for the Safety of All
Regardless of the clear racial and religious discrimination resulting from post-September 11th policies, one aspect
of advocacy strategies to combat enforcement has also required moving beyond an exclusively race-based narrative
to one that speaks to all Americans. A crucial tool has been to highlight how the government’s reliance on immigra-
tion law has not demonstrably made the country any safer.159 National security and safety is of paramount concern
to all Americans, government agencies, and lawmakers, thus making efforts that fail to meet this object more diffi-
cult to justify.
Those opposing post-September 11th immigration enforcement measures have relied upon the government’s own
statements (as well those of former officials) to show the fallacy of these types of programs. Using NSEERS as an ex-
ample, in urging for its elimination, advocates have highlighted alternative programs that the government has con-
sidered or implemented that would not be discriminatory in nature and could be more effective at determining
threats in the United States.160 One example, while still raising concerns in terms of privacy and data-sharing, is the
United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Technology (US-VISIT) program, which requires all temporary immi-
grants to register. In fact, the implementation of this program was the rationale behind DHS’ initial suspension of
certain aspects of NSEERS, such as interview requirements161 as well as the delisting of the 25 countries in the reg-
ulations governing NSEERS. 
In addition, these assurances were affirmed by various government officials, such as former DHS Undersecretary
for Border and Transportation Security Asa Hutchison, and former DHS Secretary Tom Ridge.162 Former government
officials also acknowledged that racial and religious targeting through immigration enforcement could not be effec-
tive at identifying national security threats. For example, James W. Ziglar, former INS commissioner, said that his of-
fice was skeptical about what exactly NSEERS would yield given that actual terrorists would likely not report to the
government on their own for interviews and questioned whether this was a valuable use of limited national secu-
rity resources.163 In fact, he went on to say, “[t]o my knowledge, not one actual terrorist was identified. But what
we did get was a lot of bad publicity, litigation and disruption in our relationships with immigrant communities and
countries that we needed help from in the war on terror.”164
Such statements have bolstered advocacy efforts on the Congressional front to have lawmakers speak out against
post-September 11th immigration enforcement programs. In 2004, the Civil Liberties Restoration Act (CLRA) was in-
troduced in the Senate and House of Representatives, with reintroduction in the House in 2005.165 This proposed
legislation would have eliminated NSEERS-related regulations and “administratively closed” the cases of NSEERS-re-
lated cases that met certain criteria.166 Although the bill ultimately did not succeed, a range of Senators and mem-
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bers of Congress continued to express vocal opposition to such discriminatory enforcement and questioned its ef-
fectiveness. Senators Russell Feingold, Edward Kennedy, and Dick Durbin and Congressman John Conyers have led
the charge in placing pressure on DOJ and, subsequently, DHS to demonstrate its impact and urging its elimina-
tion.167 A drumbeat of pressure from federal lawmakers lasting nearly ten years was crucial in ensuring the govern-
ment was aware the American public had not forgotten about the program – both in terms of its devastating
impact on immigrant communities and its inability to keep the country safe.
Raising Voices: Conveying the Human Impact of Enforcement in Advocacy
In order to move both policymakers and the public, South Asian, Arab, and Muslim community members have
joined other immigrant and minority communities to mobilize and present the human face behind those impacted
by post-September 11th immigration enforcement. A national security gloss over immigration gives mainstream
America the impression that those who are being rounded up and deported are dangerous, different, and do not
belong here. But, in the case of NSEERS, as in so many other immigration enforcement contexts, those who have
been caught up by such policies have been parents, siblings, and youth. And their removals have wreaked havoc on
those whom they have left behind. 
Showcasing how the casualties of this type of enforcement have been individuals in many ways no different than
other Americans has been instrumental to this movement. Illustrating stories such as the ones below from the
South Asian community members affected by NSEERS (and can indeed be found in virtually any immigrant commu-
nity affected by immigration enforcement) are intended to tell policymakers and the public: “we are not terrorists,
we are families.”
• In San Francisco, two brothers from Pakistan were placed in deportation proceedings as a result of NSEERS.
They shared their stories at a news conference convened by the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern Califor-
nia, the American Muslim Voice, and the Pakistani-American Alliance. They were no more than 17 and 19 years old
and had lived in the United States virtually their entire lives. Their mother, a teacher, said, “In 1998, we sold our
house in Pakistan to come to this country so that my sons could have a better education … My sons cannot go back
to Pakistan, there is no home for them there.”168 
• Harun Ur Rasheed moved to New York from Bangladesh in 1997 to seek medical care for advanced glau-
coma. He spent thousands of his hard-earned dollars on treatments which failed to cure his condition and decided
to stay in the country. In order to support his family back home, he got a job as a construction worker. Due to the
rampant misinformation circulating around special registration, he thought by participating he could legalize his
status. To his surprise, after he voluntarily showed up at the immigration offices at 26 Federal Plaza, he wa placed
into deportation proceedings. Ultimately, he chose to leave the country voluntarily rather than endure the ordeal
of immigration court.169
Even in the face of pervasive anti-immigrant sentiment that has ratcheted up since September 11th, community
members have courageously stepped forward to speak out against unjust enforcement and appealed to the Ameri-
can values of fairness and family. Before leaving for Bangladesh, Mr. Rasheed vowed to speak out against the injus-
tices the community underwent after NSEERS and held a press conference outside his Brooklyn mosque. During the
event, coordinated by the organization Families for Freedom, he said:
I honored your law, Mr. Ashcroft, and you gave me deportation. You say this is a human rights country? 
You should have given me a way to fix my immigration status. I have no other option, but I will not leave quietly.
167Press Release, Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), Senators and Congressman Demand Ashcroft Suspend INS Special Registration (Dec. 26,
2002), available at http://www.adc.org/media/press-releases/2002/december-2002/senators-and-congressman-demand-ashcroft-suspend-ins-special-registration/.
168Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, American Muslim Voice & Pakistani-American Alliance, Immigrants targeted for deportation after participating in INS
Special Registration program speak out at the ACLU-AMV-PAA Press Conference (July 1, 2003).
169SPECIAL REGISTRANTS ACTION NETWORK, REPORT TO THE 9/11 COMMISSION FROM THE SPECIAL REGISTRANTS ACTION NETWORK (2003).  See also Harun, FAMI-
LIES FOR FREEDOM,  http://www.familiesforfreedom.org/httpdocs/our_families/harun.html.
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Efforts to organize, mobilize, and document the experiences of those whose lives were disrupted by policies such as
NSEERS became critical tools used by entities engaged in policy advocacy efforts. Organizations such as the Coney
Island Avenue Project, Council of Peoples Organization, Desis Rising Up and Moving (DRUM), Families for Freedom,
and South Asian Network sprung into action to lend a voice to affected South Asians. Parallel and collaborative ef-
forts were done in other immigrant communities as well. DRUM, along with the Immigrant Justice Solidarity Project
and the Prison Moratorium Project, launched the Stop the Disappearances Campaign. Through the campaign, com-
munity members rallied to urge government agencies to process backlogged immigration applications, particularly
of those who had pending petitions before the government initiated special registration. In addition, mobilization
and advocacy was done side-by-side Latino communities suffering from increased border enforcement and immi-
gration raids since September 11th. Using these real-life stories of community members, national organizations
have elevated these tragedies to policymakers and the public to underscore the consequences of these policy
choices.
Recommendations and Looking Ahead
Ten years after September 11th, the convoluted ways in which immigration enforcement has manifested itself have
only multiplied. In the name of national security and border integrity, federal programs allowing state and local law
enforcement to carry out immigration laws have emerged in full force. Immigrants are being increasingly searched,
questioned, and detained upon entry into the country. And states and municipalities have jumped into the fray
with their own anti-immigrant measures. With what has transpired over the past ten years and what lays ahead, it
is vital that policy analyses, advocacy efforts, and mobilization strategies be rooted in lenses that both include and
expand beyond race. The realities have shown us that immigration enforcement has adapted to targeting on the
basis of religion, ethnicity and national origin; that often the strongest tools are to show how current enforcement
measures endanger all Americans; and that, fundamentally, there are real people and communities whose lives are
left in shambles as a result.
As a glimmer of hope, by adopting some of these approaches over the past ten years, local and national efforts un-
dertaken by community members and organizations have recently borne at least some fruit. In April 2011, after
over eight years of mobilizations and advocacy, DHS modified NSEERS so that individuals from the 25 listed coun-
tries were no longer subject to its requirements. While the fate of those who were placed in deportation proceed-
ings still remains in question, the call for fairness and justice within our country’s immigration system was heard.
Challenges persist for all immigrants in the post-September 11th era, but the diversity of voices urging humane
policies that reaffirm our country’s commitment to diversity, inclusion, and fairness continue as well. As I recall that
fateful day ten years ago, the unity and compassion of Americans that spread for at least a few fleeting moments is
the spirit that needs to continue in the paths before us. 
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The Human Rights of Immigrants: Confronting the Legacy of 9/11
I. Introduction
International rights law is based on the fundamental premise that “All human beings are born free and equal in dig-
nity and rights.”170 That promise of equality and dignity in rights, and the accompanying obligation to take affirma-
tive measures to ensure the realization of those rights, has motivated a growing advocacy community to engage
with international human rights mechanisms in an effort to realize equality in dignity and rights for communities,
particularly immigrant communities, confronting the legacies of 9/11, challenging the policies and practices that
have resulted in ongoing violations of their fundamental human rights.  
Advocates are increasingly engaging in international human rights mechanisms for multiple reasons.  The leading
reason is that the domestic legal regime has failed to adequately address the rights at issue.  With regard to immi-
grants, it reflects an effort to change the narrative of immigration and the characterization of immigrants, not as
human beings equal in dignity and rights, but “aliens” or “illegals” or any other of a number of monikers used to
distinguish non-citizens from citizens, a distinction used to justify discrimination in the enjoyment and enforcement
of rights.  Furthermore, international human rights law creates affirmative obligations to protect and promote
rights, rather than merely provide remedies to be pursued after those rights have been violated.  By bringing these
debates before the international community, advocates also seek to gain the U.S. government’s explicit recognition
of immigrant rights, and in response to that recognition, to gain the United States’ commitments on the interna-
tional stage to take measures to ensure the protection and promotion of those rights.  Advocates also seek to em-
ploy and leverage the support of the international community in their efforts to pressure the U.S. government in
taking those affirmative steps towards the protection and promotion of the fundamental human rights of immi-
grants, adding a layer of accountability.  Furthermore, through engaging in an international dialogue on the subject
of immigration – a subject of debate not unique to the United States – advocates can join a collective movement to
strengthen applicable international human rights norms, and to establish a set of best practices that serve to pro-
mote and protect the fundamental rights of all immigrants.  
While there has been progress in the rhetoric of rights as applied to immigrants, there is still significant work to be
done to translate that rhetoric into reality.  Before addressing the challenges confronting immigrants in the post-
9/11 period as they seek to convert rights to realities, it is important to put those challenges in their historical con-
text, and to recognize the United States’ long and troubled history of immigration.  We remember the history
Japanese internment during World War II.171 We remember how quickly the then Immigration and Naturalization
SARAH H. PAOLETTI
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September 16, 2011
170Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, art. I, UN Doc. A/810 (1948).
171See Archives Library Information Center, Japanese Relocation and Internment During World War II, NATIONAL ARCHIVES,
http://www.archives.gov/research/alic/reference/military/japanese-internment.html. 
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172See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY ON ASYLUM SEEKERS 4, 6 (2005), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32621.pdf. 
173See NATIONAL IMMIGRATION FORUM, 1996 IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION SUMMARY (1996), available at http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/up-
loads/1996%20Legislation%20Summary.pdf.  See also The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, enacted April 24, 1996
(following the Oklahoma City bombing) (also referred to as AEDPA); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat.
3009-546, enacted Sept. 30, 1996. 
174See Human Rights Council, G.A. Res. 60/251, U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/251 (Mar. 15, 2006) (establishing the Human Rights Council).  See also
Human Rights Council, Res. 5/1 (June 18, 2007), Annex I (establishing the modalities for the Universal Periodic Review).
175See Universal Periodic Review of the United States of America: National Report Submitted to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
¶ 12 (2011), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/upr/index.htm [hereinafter National Report]. 
Service stripped asylum seekers of employment authorization and otherwise sought to restrict the rights of asylum
seekers after terrorists drove a truck into the World Trade Center in 1993.172 And, we remember the furor with
which Congress made numerous and significant changes to our welfare and immigration laws 1996, denying immi-
grants access to life-saving public benefits, establishing a one-year filing deadline for persons seeking asylum, im-
plementing summary exclusion for persons arriving at our borders, creating mandatory detention for immigrants
based on a dramatically expanded list of crimes, severely restricting judicial review, and putting into place numer-
ous other provisions limiting the rights of all immigrants, from those seeking admission to those with lawful perma-
nent resident status.173 And so the pendulum has swung: towards increased restrictions and deprivation of rights
fueled by the winds of fear, with an occasional and slight swing back towards a more even-handed and practical
regulatory approach in times of calm and security. That time of calm and security was the start of the 21st Century
and the pendulum was starting to swing back, and then the tragedies of September 11, 2001 happened.  
Since 9/11, the United States’ policies and practices vis-à-vis immigrants and immigrant communities have been
assessed before a variety of UN human rights review processes, through treaty review mechanisms measuring
compliance with ratified treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the In-
ternational Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), and the Convention
Against Torture (CAT), as well as through the Universal Periodic Review, which assesses human rights compliance
based not only on the standards set forth in the treaties the United States has ratified, but also on standards set
forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the UN Charter.  At the regional level, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights has conducted an extensive multi-year review of U.S. immigrant detention
and due process that resulted in the publication of a comprehensive report of that title in March 2011.  Through its
engagement in these processes over the past decade, the United States’ level of engagement has increased, and
with the Obama Administration we have seen a slight shift in the rhetoric employed consistent with its renewed in-
ternational engagement, but significant shortcomings in implementation persist.  
Others have and will continue to discuss and debate the immigration policies and practices put into place in the
days, weeks, and years after 9/11.  My purpose here is to briefly elaborate on the international human rights advo-
cacy undertaken before the United Nations and the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, and to call atten-
tion to specific recommendations that have followed.  
II. Immigration and Human Rights As Assessed By and Before the International Community
On November 5, 2010, the United States underwent its first Universal Periodic Review (UPR) before the United Na-
tions. The UPR is a relatively new review process established with the creation of the UN Human Rights Council in
2006, and it is a process by which all UN Member States undergo an assessment of the situation of human rights in
their country, as measured against the rights contained in the human rights treaty that State has ratified, as well as
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) and the UN Charter.174 As with reviews before other interna-
tional human rights mechanisms, the rights of immigrants featured prominently throughout the process.
In its written report submitted in advance of the UPR, the United States affirmed its commitment to human rights
in the United States, noting: “This basic truth [that all persons are born equal in dignity and rights] suggests the
kinds of obligations—both positive and negative—that governments have with regard to their citizens.”175 Unfor-
tunately, the U.S. Report seems to imply these rights and obligations apply specifically to citizens, but UDHR explic-
itly provides  “[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction
of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, prop-
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erty, birth or other status.”176 Nonetheless, the Report is significant in the United States’ recognition of govern-
ment’s positive and negative obligations, noting governments’ obligations to “create the laws and institutions that
secure [fundamental] freedoms,” and recognizing “[p]eople should enjoy fair treatment reflected in due process
and equality before the law,” noting governments’ obligations “not to discriminate or persecute” and to “establish
mechanisms for protection and redress,” and finally noting governments’ “obligation to protect the security of the
person and to respect human dignity.”177 Significant work remains, however, to ensure that those rights and obliga-
tions are reflected in affirmative action aimed to effectuate meaningful and positive change in the daily lives of im-
migrants and their families.  
A. Right to be Free from Discrimination
The UDHR, ICERD, and the ICCPR all contain inclusive and expansive provisions related to protections against dis-
crimination.  Through the various review processes, advocates have worked to ensure the discrimination endured
by immigrants in all sectors of life throughout the United States is raised and addressed.  The U.S. UPR process was
just the latest of those review processes in which the United States was challenged to confront the persistence of
discrimination and other acts of intolerance directed towards immigrants and immigrant communities.  
Following its 2008 review of U.S. compliance with its obligations under ICERD, the Committee on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination noted its concern that “racial profiling … continues to be widespread,” and specifically
provided that it was “deeply concerned about the increase in racial profiling against Arabs, Muslims and South
Asians in the wake of the 9/11 attack,” and the development of the National Entry and Exit Registration System
(NEERS).  The Committee recommended the United States:
[S]trengthen its efforts to combat racial profiling at the federal and state levels, inter alia by moving expeditiously
towards the adoption of the End Racial Profiling Act, or similar federal legislation. The Committee also draws 
the attention of the State party to its general recommendation no. 30 (2004) on discrimination against non-
citizens, according to which measures taken in the fight against terrorism must not discriminate, in purpose or 
effect, on the grounds of race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin, and urges the State party, in 
accordance with article 2, paragraph 1 (c), of the Convention, to put an end to the National [Security Entry-
Exit] Registration System (N[S]EERS) and to eliminate other forms of racial profiling against Arabs, Muslims and 
South Asians.178
The U.S. National Report for the UPR process briefly acknowledged discrimination and other acts of intolerance ex-
perienced by the Muslim, Arab-American, and South Asian communities in the post-9/11 era, and noted its com-
mitment to “ongoing efforts to combat discrimination.”  As a reflection of that commitment, the United States
de-populated the NSEERS program in April 2011, removing from the program all countries subjected to NSEERS.
But, importantly, it did not do away with the program, leaving in place a mechanism through which discriminatory
immigration enforcement can readily be implemented again.  
With regard to racial profiling, the U.S. National Report makes brief mention of the Attorney General’s review of the
2003 Guidance Regarding the Use of Race by Federal Law Enforcement Agencies, but fails to identify programs such
as 287(g) and Secure Communities as direct contributors to persistent racial profiling.179 While the U.S. is right to
take note of the work of the Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties within the Department of Homeland Security in
investigating and pursuing complaints of discrimination and other civil rights and civil liberties violations, it fails to
address affirmative measures – beyond its training program and guidelines that to date have proven ineffective in
176UDHR, supra note 170, at art. 2.
177National Report, supra note 175, ¶ 12-15.
178See U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: United
States of America, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/USA/CO/6 (May 8, 2008), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/cerds72.htm [hereinafter CERD Con-
cluding Observations and Recommendations].
179See Submission to the United Nations Universal Periodic Review Ninth Session of the UPR Working Group of the Human Rights Council, The Persistence, in the
United States, of Discriminatory Profiling Based on Race, Ethnicity, Religion and National Origin (Nov. 2010), available at
http://www.ushrnetwork.org/sites/default/files/Racial%20Profiling%20Joint%20Report%20USA.pdf. 
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180See National Report, supra note 175, ¶ 94 (noting: “DHS has made improvements to the 287(g) program, including implementing a new, standardized Memoran-
dum of Agreement with state and local partners that strengthens program oversight and provides uniform guidelines for DHS supervision of state and local agency
officer operations; information reporting and tracking; complaint procedures; and implementation measures. DHS continues to evaluate the program, incorporating
additional safeguards as necessary to aid in the prevention of racial profiling and civil rights violations and improve accountability for protecting human rights.”). 
181See Submission to the United Nations Universal Periodic Review Ninth Session of the UPR Working Group of the Human Rights Council, Migrant Labor Rights (April
2010), available at http://www.ushrnetwork.org/sites/default/files/declaration-treaty/Migrant%20Labor%20Joint%20Report%20USA.pdf.  See also CERD Concluding
Observations and Recommendations, supra note 178, ¶ 28.
182National Report, supra note 175, ¶ 92-96.
183See National Report, supra note 175, ¶ 93.  Unfortunately, the United States did not address in the UPR process concerns raised by CERD about use of excessive
force and brutality by law enforcement officials, including toward Latino and African-American persons and undocumented migrants at the U.S.-Mexico border, see
CERD Concluding Observations and Recommendations, supra note 178, ¶ 25, or the number of deaths on the U.S.-Mexico border that have resulted from zealous im-
migration enforcement and private acts of vigilantism.
protecting against abuses – to be taken to ensure those violations do not occur at the outset.180 The failure of the
Department of Homeland Security to suspend or terminate the 287(g) agreement with Maricopa County, AZ, de-
spite an ongoing federal investigation into persistent rights violations committed by Sheriff Joe Arpaio and his po-
lice department under the guise of authority granted him by the 287(g) agreement, is among the clearer examples
of where the Administration has not fulfilled its obligations to ensure the dignity and security of all human beings.
Furthermore, while the US takes pride in the “Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s enforcement efforts to
combat backlash-related employment discrimination which resulted in over $5 million for victims from 2001-2006,”
it does not address the numerous other ways in which immigrants are discriminated against in the workplace.
Specifically, it fails to acknowledge how the denial of federally-funded legal services to undocumented workers and
H-2B visa holders, industry specific statutory exclusions from protections under federal minimum wage and over-
time protections, the judicially created denial of individualized remedies for undocumented migrants whose rights
under the National Labor Relations Act resulting in the denial of the right to freedom of association, and immigra-
tion enforcement more generally, contribute to and allow for persistent discrimination in rights and remedies avail-
able to immigrants in the workplace.181 
B. Due Process, Human Rights, and Immigration
Immigration policies and practices are addressed more directly in the National Report under the category of
“Human Rights, Values, and National Security,” explicitly introducing and privileging national security into the narra-
tive.  More specifically, the Report addresses Immigration under the subheading, “Values and Immigration,” rather
than “Human Rights and Immigration,”182 taking pride in the U.S.’ history of immigration while at the same time un-
derstating its obligations, and limiting its discussion around enforcement to issues pertaining to immigrant deten-
tion.  Specifically, the Report notes the Department of Homeland Security’s efforts “to improve detention center
management and prioritize health, safety, and uniformity among immigration detention facilities, while ensuring
security and efficiency. As part of this effort, in conjunction with ongoing consultations with non-governmental or-
ganizations and outside experts, DHS issued revised parole guidelines, effective January 2010, for arriving aliens in
expedited removal found to have a credible fear of persecution or torture.”183
DHS’ detention guidelines set forth a set of principles aimed at protecting the due process, dignity, and security of
immigrants subject to detention, and go a long way towards ensuring – on paper – a number of fundamental
human rights at issue.  However, the guidelines are not uniformly followed and there is insufficient transparency,
oversight and accountability in the system to ensure the protection of the human rights not only of the immigrants
subject to detention, but also their family members.  From 2008 through 2010, the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights took up a study of U.S. immigrant detention policies and practices, looking at all aspects of deten-
tion, from the means by which individuals are taken into detention, their rights in detention, and the opportunities
for release.  In March 2011, the Commission released Report on Immigration in the United States: Detention and
Due Process, in which it “expressed its concern with the increasing use of detention of migrants based on the pre-
sumption of its necessity, when in fact detention should be the exception,” and its concern with “the impact of de-
tention on due process.”  Furthermore, the Commission noted,” even in those cases in which detention is strictly
necessary, there is no genuinely civil system where the general conditions comply with standards of respect for
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human dignity and humane treatment; there is also a lack of the special conditions required for in cases of non-
punitive detention.”184 The Commission then issued a series of recommendations related to interior enforcement,
detention, civil detention conditions, due process, and the rights of families and unaccompanied children.
III. Conclusion: What Next in the Effort to Convert Rights into Reality in the Post-9/11 World
The U.S. Universal Periodic Review culminated in a Report containing over 200 recommendations to the United
States made by countries across the world.185 A significant number of those specifically addressed the rights of im-
migrants, reflecting the priorities set forth by civil society in its advocacy efforts throughout the process, and can
be placed into two categories: recommendations addressing racial profiling and discrimination;186 and recommen-
dations addressing immigrant detention.187 In responding to the recommendations, the Administration stated,
“With respect to immigration, the United States is committed to addressing concerns about detention, discrimina-
tion, and racial and ethnic profiling.  We are committed to advancing comprehensive immigration reform as an al-
ternative to piecemeal state and local measures.”188
It is now incumbent upon the advocacy community to ensure the recommendations coming out of the Universal
Periodic Review and the other international human rights mechanisms are translated into effective policies and
practices that include systems of transparency and accountability.   The shift in rhetoric, stated commitments, and
the dialogues that have taken place in Geneva and in Washington, DC, give advocates entry points through which
they can press for meaningful advancements in human rights.  As they do so, it is important to push beyond indi-
vidual complaints, beyond changes in guidelines and memoranda that can be changed with the next Administra-
tion or the next tragedy that breathes new fear into the debate on immigration.  International human rights can
provide the framework for advocating for and creating lasting and systemic change based on notions of human dig-
nity rather than national security, but it is advocates, civil society, and the immigrant communities themselves that
must meet the challenge, confront the legacies, and make change happen. 
184INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: DETENTION AND DUE PROCESS ¶ 416, 418-19 (2011), avail-
able at http://cidh.org/countryrep/USImmigration/TOC.htm. 
185See U.N. General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, United States of America, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/16/11 (Jan. 4, 2011), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G11/100/69/PDF/G1110069.pdf?OpenElement.
186Id., ¶ 92.64, 92.68, 92.79, 92.82, 92.101, 92.104, 92.108, 92.110, 92.219, 92.220.
187Id., ¶ 92.105, 92.182-185, 92.212.
188See Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor U.S. Department of State, Response of the United States of America to Recommendations of the United Nations Human





Susan Akram, Professor of Law at the Boston University School of Law, was born and raised in Lahore, Pakistan, in
a multicultural, multiethnic, multilingual household. “My father’s family were refugees from the 1947 India-Pak-
istan partition, and my own life experiences and professional choices have been indelibly marked by that legacy,”
she says.
Her early exposure to the plight of refugees steered her into a legal career in immigration and refugee law. Profes-
sor Akram worked for many years as an immigration lawyer before joining the BU faculty in 1993. She has served
as executive director of Boston’s Political Asylum/Immigration Representation Project and as directing attorney of
the immigration project at Public Counsel, a public interest law firm in Los Angeles. In 1992 she was interim direc-
tor of the agency overseeing the resettlement of Gulf War Iraqi refugees in Saudi Arabia.
At BU, Professor Akram teaches in the Civil Litigation Clinic, where she supervises law students in their representa-
tion of indigent clients in immigration and refugee cases. She also teaches Immigration Law and Policy and Com-
parative Refugee Law. Her distinguished research was recognized with a Fulbright Senior Scholar Teaching and
Research Award for the 1999-2000 academic year. She used the grant to research and write recommendations for
a durable solution for Palestinian refugees in light of the 1993 Oslo Talks, and to teach at the Palestine School of
Law at Al-Quds University in East Jerusalem.
“My areas of teaching and practice are an extension of my personal, political and philosophical beliefs about law as
a change agent for social justice,” she says. “The rewards are many, from restoring safety and security to individual
lives, to giving students the satisfaction of using law for positive change.”
DONALD KERWIN JR.
Donald Kerwin is the Executive Director of the Center for Migration Studies (CMS), an institute established in 1969
to study migration policy issues and to safeguard the dignity and rights of migrants, refugees, and newcomers.
Prior to joining CMS, Mr. Kerwin served as Vice-President for Programs at the Migration Policy Institute (MPI),
where he remains a non-resident senior fellow.
Prior to joining MPI, Mr. Kerwin worked for 16 years at the Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc. (CLINIC), serv-
ing as that agency’s director for 15 years. CLINIC, a subsidiary of the US Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB), is
a public interest legal corporation that supports a national network of charitable legal programs for immigrants.
Upon his arrival at CLINIC in 1992, Mr. Kerwin coordinated the agency’s political asylum project for Haitians.
Mr. Kerwin serves as an associate fellow at the Woodstock Theological Center. He also serves on the American Bar
Association’s Commission on Immigration and the board of directors of the Border Network for Human Rights. He
previously participated on the Council on Foreign Relations’ Immigration Task Force and the board of the Capitol
Area Immigrant Rights Coalition. He chairs the advocacy committee of Jesuit Refugee Services—USA, and writes






Sin Yen Ling is a staff attorney at the Asian Law Caucus focusing on immigrants’ rights. Her most current litigation
includes Ahmadi v. Chertoff, a class action lawsuit addressing naturalization delays caused by the FBI name check
process. It also includes complex litigation involving illegal detention of U.S. citizens; suppression cases in deporta-
tion involving constitutional violations; challenging material support to terrorism and general detention/deporta-
tion issues in Federal Court. She is a former staff attorney at the New York-based Asian American Legal Defense and
Education Fund (AALDEF) where she has spent 6 years conducting litigation and advocacy in the areas of anti-Asian
violence, racial profiling and immigrant detention/deportation. A native New Yorker, Ms. Ling was born in Manhat-
tan’s Chinatown to immigrant parents who worked in garment factories and restaurants. She is a graduate of New
York University and City University of New York School of Law. Ms. Ling managed AALDEF’s Immigrant Access to Jus-
tice Project which has been at the forefront of providing direct representation to South Asian, Arab, Filipino and
Muslim immigrant detainees facing indefinite detention after September 11 and has been a leading advocate for
the defense of civil liberties and civil rights of immigrants and their families.
Ms. Ling has been quoted in the New York Times, Newsweek, New Jersey Law Journal, Crain’s New York Business
and the Financial Times, and has been profiled in the Village Voice. In 2002, she was selected as one of the Top 25
Lawyers Under 40 by the National Asian Pacific American Bar Association. In 2003, she was awarded the New York
County Lawyer’s Association’s Public Service Award and the Joseph Minsky Young Lawyers Award by the American
Immigration Lawyers Association. In 2005, she received the Alumni award from CUNY Law School’s Public Interest
Law Association, Proclamation of Service from New York City’s City Council, and the Community Service Award
from the Islamic Circle of North America.
Ms. Ling is fluent in Cantonese and conversational in Mandarin. She is a member of the New York State Bar, Na-
tional Immigration Project, and the American Immigration Lawyers Association.
TIYANJANA MALUWA
Tiyanjana Maluwa is the Associate Dean for International Affairs at Penn State's Dickinson School of Law and holds
the H. Laddie Montague Chair in Law. He was recently appointed Director of the newly established Penn State
School of International Affairs. Recognized internationally for his extensive scholarly writings and expertise in public
international law and human rights, he has been called upon to serve as a special expert and consultant to the
United Nations, the African Union and other organizations. He previously worked as the first legal counsel of the
African Union (previously the Organization of African Unity) at its headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and, sub-
sequently, as the legal advisor to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva.
Prior to joining the African Union and the United Nations, he was a Professor of International Law at the University
of Cape Town, South Africa, and Extraordinary Professor of Law at the Centre for Human Rights at the University of
Pretoria, South Africa. He has also taught and lectured at a number of other universities in Africa, Europe and the
U.S. Dean Maluwa has written and edited books, contributed chapters to several books and is the author of numer-
ous articles in academic journals and other publications. In 1997, he was asked by the United Nations to serve as
the Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Nigeria following the execution of the famed poet-activist Ken Saro
Wiwa. He currently serves as a member of the International Jury for the Stockholm Prize in Criminology.
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PRIYA MURTHY
Priya Murthy is the Policy Director at SAALT. As Policy Director, she monitors and analyzes legislative and adminis-
trative policies affecting the South Asian community; conducts advocacy on various policy issues; and develops ed-
ucational materials for the South Asian community members and organizations. She also represents the
organization as a member of immigrant and civil rights coalitions as well as before lawmakers and governmental
agencies. She previously worked for various Immigration Courts, the Amnesty International Refugee Office and the
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees in New Delhi. Priya received her J.D. from Tulane University and her B.A.
from the University of California at Berkeley in Peace and Conflict Studies.
SARAH PAOLETTI
Sarah Paoletti currently directs the Transnational Legal Clinic at the University of Pennsylvania School of Law.  Be-
fore coming to Penn Law, Paoletti taught in the International Human Rights Law Clinic at American University
Washington College of Law, where she also taught a seminar on the labor and employment rights of immigrant
workers. Her areas of specialty include international human rights, migrant and immigrant rights, asylum law, and
labor and employment. She has presented on the rights of migrant workers before the United Nations and the Or-
ganization of American States, and also works closely with advocates seeking application of international human
rights norms in the United States. Her recent scholarship includes: “Transnational Approaches to Transnational Ex-
ploitation: A Proposal for Bi-National Migrant Rights Clinics,” 30 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International
Law 1171 (Summer 2009).
WENDY PATTEN
Wendy Patten is a senior policy analyst at the Open Society Policy Center (OSPC) engaging in advocacy on U.S.
human rights and civil liberties issues. She works to influence the public policy debate around counter-terrorism
and human rights, including detention, interrogation, rendition, and surveillance. She also monitors immigration
policy with a focus on due process.
Previously, Patten was the U.S. advocacy director at Human Rights Watch where she handled legislative, policy,
and media advocacy on human rights in the United States. Patten was also senior counsel at the U.S. Department
of Justice where she focused on a wide range of criminal justice and immigration policy issues. She worked exten-
sively on implementation of U.S. anti-trafficking laws and the Violence Against Women Act with federal, state, and
local prosecutors, law enforcement, judges, and non-governmental organizations.  Patten has also served as direc-
tor of Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs at the National Security Council at the White House. In that capacity,
she handled refugee, migration, and human rights issues. 
Patten began her legal career as a Skadden Fellow and legal aid lawyer at Ayuda, where she represented immigrant
and refugee women in domestic violence, family law, and immigration matters. She also worked on legal and judi-
cial reform programs abroad at the American Bar Association's Rule of Law Initiative. 
Patten received her J.D. from Harvard Law School and a B.A. from Princeton University. She studied international




Steven Rubin, Assistant Professor of Art in the Photography Program at Penn State University, worked for many
years as a photojournalist and documentary photographer, traveling on assignment in Iraq, Rwanda, Kosovo, Pak-
istan, Turkey, Chile and Cuba, and throughout the United States. His photographs have been published in maga-
zines, including The New York Times Magazine, National Geographic, Time, Newsweek, Stern, GEO, Focus, L’Express
and The London Independent Magazine, and in numerous books including Schattenlicht – The Best of Black and
White Photography and The Century (Phaidon). His work has been exhibited in venues throughout the United
States and featured at the International Festival Visa pour L’Image, in Perpignan, France. He is the recipient of the
Leica Medal of Excellence, a New York Foundation for the Arts (NYFA) Fellowship, a Nieman Fellowship at Harvard,
and an Alicia Patterson Journalism Fellowship. He was a Fellow with the Open Society Institute, which supported
his photographic investigation of the U.S. government’s detention of immigrants, and funded his development of
Healing Images, a program providing digital cameras, instruction and therapy to survivors of torture. A graduate of
Reed College in Portland, Oregon in Sociology, he obtained his MFA in Visual Arts from the University of California.
ERICH SCHERFEN
Erich Scherfen enlisted in the Army just after finishing High School in 1989. He graduated Infantry Basic Training,
and earned his wings as a Parachutist at Ft. Benning, Georgia. He served in the U.S. Army as an infantryman during
the First Persian Gulf War where he was awarded his CIB (combat infantry badge). Later, he left the full time
Army, joined the New Jersey National Guard, and went to Kean University, where he received his Bachelor's in Fine
Art. He also worked as a fixed-wing flight instructor and tour pilot around New York City.
Scherfen later received his commission as a U.S. Army Lieutenant and went on to pursue his love for flying in the
U.S. Army's flight school at Fort Rucker, Alabama, where he gained qualifications on various helicopters including
AH-64 Apache and AH-1 Cobra.
Scherfen converted to Islam after his military tour of the Middle East. He has been an avid student of the Islamic
Sciences since his conversion and gives talks about Islam in universities and interfaith gatherings.
Scherfen currently flies for Continental Express. He is married and lives in Pennsylvania.
KAREEM SHORA
Kareem W. Shora, JD, LLM is Senior Policy Advisor and Section Lead of the Community Engagement Section with
the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of the Secretary, Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
(CRCL), in Washington, DC. In his position, Shora serves as a key expert and advisor, represents the Department at
high-level meetings with executives from other government agencies, Congressional staff, and non- governmental
organizations, and provides expert analysis to propose and support leadership decisions such as justifying or set-
tling matters involving significant and controversial program policies of national scope and impact. Shora also su-
pervises the staff of the Community Engagement Section in their responsibilities and strengthens and builds
strategic partnerships with key ethnic and religious communities through outreach and related activities that re-
spond to public concerns regarding the policies and practices of DHS. He is responsible for creating effective chan-
nels of communication that allow for the rapid dissemination of information to those key communities in the event
of a national security incident and assesses existing and proposed DHS programs, policies and activities for civil
rights and civil liberties compliance, with a focus on possible disparate impact on key communities.
Shora joined DHS in October, 2009, after a ten-year tenure with the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee
(ADC) where he served as legal advisor, legal director, and national executive director. In June of 2009, he was ap-
pointed by Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano as a member of the Homeland Security Advisory Council
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(HSAC); the official advisory body for the DHS Secretary on homeland security matters. Shora is also a member of
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) Heritage Community Liaison Council. His experience in-
cludes serving as a guest lecturer at the Yale University School of Law. He was also certified as an expert witness on
xenophobia and anti-Arab discrimination by the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Central District of
California. Shora is a recipient of the 2003 American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) “Arthur C. Helton
Human Rights Award" and has been published by the National Law Journal, TRIAL Magazine, the Georgetown Uni-
versity Law Center's Journal on Poverty Law and Public Policy, the Harvard University JFK School of Government
Asian American Policy Review, the American Bar Association (ABA) Air and Space Lawyer, and the Yeshiva Univer-
sity Cardozo Public Law Policy and Ethics Journal among others.
A frequent guest on Al-Jazeera, Al Arabiya, BBC, and numerous American television programs, Shora has spoken
about civil rights, civil liberties, immigration, and national security policy with many national and international
media outlets. He has also testified before major international human rights bodies including regular testimonies
before the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), where he was routinely consulted as a sub-
ject- matter expert on tolerance, diversity and integration. He was selected by the Ford Foundation as a member of
the Foreign Policy Task Force designing their 2008 Laboratory for New Thinking on Foreign Policy. He was also se-
lected by the Police Foundation to be part of their 2008 Advisory Board on the study of the role of local police in
immigration enforcement. Shora was also the civil society representative on the G8 Experts Roundtable on Diver-
sity, Integration, and the Prevention of Terrorism. Born in Damascus, Syria and fluent in Arabic, Shora is a native of
Huntington, West Virginia, a graduate of Marshall University and holds a Doctor of Jurisprudence (JD) degree from
the West Virginia University (WVU) College of Law and the LL.M. specialty in International Legal Studies (Public Inter-
national Law) from the American University Washington College of Law.
MARGARET STOCK
Margaret Stock is an adjunct faculty member in the Department of Political Science at the University of Alaska An-
chorage where she teaches Introduction to American Government.  Professor Stock is interested in issues of immi-
gration, citizenship, national security, military affairs, and constitutional law.  Professor Stock has frequently
testified before Congress on issues relating to immigration and national security, has authored numerous articles
on immigration and citizenship topics, and frequently speaks at public events on topics such as birthright citizen-
ship, immigration and the US military, and immigration and national security.
Professor Stock is an Alaska attorney and a retired military officer.  She recently transferred to the Retired Reserve
of the US Army Reserve after serving in the Military Police Corps, US Army Reserve for twenty-eight years.  Profes-
sor Stock taught at the US Military Academy, West Point, New York from June 2001 until June 2010.  In the fall of
2009, Professor Stock was a Visiting Fellow at the Border Policy Research Institute at Western Washington Univer-
sity.  Professor Stock also recently concluded service as a member of the Council on Foreign Relations Independent
Task Force on US Immigration Policy.
RUBINA TAREEN
Rubina Tareen is a business owner who has spent the last two decades as a community builder, activist, and volun-
teer. She currently serves on the boards of The ACLU-PA, The American Red Cross of Schuylkill and Northumber-
land counties, World Affairs Council of Harrisburg, Interfaith Health Network of Schuylkill County and serves as
outreach director of the Islamic Center of Reading and Islamic Society of Schuylkill County. She is also an advisory
board member of CAIR- PA. She frequently gives speeches about Islam and Muslims to religious institutions and
colleges.
She became an ACLU client in 2008 when she and her husband were wrongfully put on the federal government's
"Terrorist Watch List," seemingly because of their Muslim faith. Since then, she has become an active member and
The 9/11 Effect
- 66 -
at-large board member of ACLU-PA, working to build awareness in the Muslim community of the work the ACLU is
doing to protect the civil liberties of Muslims in the U.S.
Ms. Tareen was born in Pakistan and moved to the United States at age sixteen. She is the mother of five children
and lives in Pennsylvania.
SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA
Immigration law expert Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia directs the Penn State Center for Immigrants’ Rights, a clinic fo-
cused on innovative advocacy and policy projects relating to U.S. immigration policy. Professor Wadhia researches
the role of prosecutorial discretion in immigration law; the association between detention, removal and due
process; and the intersection between immigration, national security, and race. Professor Wadhia teaches or has
taught asylum and refugee law, immigration law, and a clinical course on immigration law and policy.
Prior to joining Penn State Law, Professor Wadhia was deputy director for legal affairs at the National Immigration
Forum in Washington, D.C., where she worked on issues surrounding the creation of the U.S. Department of Home-
land Security and “post 9-11” executive branch policies impacting immigrant communities. Professor Wadhia has
been honored by the Department of Homeland Security’s Office for Inspector General and Office for Civil Rights
and Civil Liberties, and in 2003, she was named Pro Bono Attorney of the Year by the Arab-American Anti-Discrimi-
nation Committee. She has also been an associate with Maggio Kattar, P.C. in Washington, D.C., where she litigated
asylum, deportation, and employment-based immigration benefits matters.
Professor Wadhia serves on the ABA Commission on Immigration and is a member of the American Immigration
Lawyers Association and National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers’ Guild. Professor Wadhia currently
serves on the boards of the Pennsylvania Immigration Resource Center and Pennsylvania Chapter of the American
Civil Liberties Unions. Prior to embarking on a legal career, she conducted human rights work in India and South
Africa.
JULIE MYERS WOOD
Julie Myers Wood is the President of ICS Consulting, LLC (ICS) and Immigration and Customs Solutions, LLC.  In
these capacities, Ms. Wood brings her extensive background to help build business solutions for companies, large
and small.  Ms. Wood has been instrumental in developing proprietary software products that assist employers
with compliance issues, including SecureID.
Prior to founding these companies, Ms. Wood served as head of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for
nearly three years. In this role, she led the largest investigative component of the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity and the second largest investigative agency in the federal government, with more than 17,000 employees and
an annual budget of more than $5 billion. During her tenure, ICE had five integrated divisions (Detention and Re-
moval Operations, Investigations, Federal Protective Service, Intelligence, and International Affairs).  Under her
leadership, the agency set new enforcement records with respect to immigration enforcement, export enforce-
ment, and intellectual property rights. Her tenure is best known for building efficiency and breaking the mold of
traditional enforcement. 
Ms. Wood is a frequent speaker and commentator on immigration and law enforcement issues. She has appeared
on FOX, CNN, C-SPAN, ABC, CNBC, MSNBC, NPR, and numerous other television and radio stations. She is a member
of the Advisory Committee for the American Bar Association’s Commission on Immigration and the Constitution
Project’s Immigration Committee. 
Her previous leadership positions in the federal government include service as Assistant Secretary for Export En-
forcement at the Department of Commerce, Chief of Staff for the Criminal Division at the Department of Justice,
and Deputy Assistant Secretary at the Treasury Department.  Ms. Wood also served as an Assistant United States
Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, where she prosecuted a variety of criminal cases, including financial
crimes, immigration violations, securities fraud, and other white-collar criminal cases.
Before entering government service, Ms. Wood was an associate at Mayer, Brown & Platt in Chicago, Ill. She also
clerked for the Honorable C. Arlen Beam of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.  Ms. Wood
earned a bachelor's degree at Baylor University and a J.D. from Cornell Law School. 
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